Villa Cora – Bailey's Fine Jewelry

k Followers, Following, Posts - See Instagram photos and videos from Cora Diamond (@cora_diamond). Followers, Following, 46 Posts - See Instagram photos and videos from Cora Diamond (@coradiamond). 45 Followers, 2 Following, 0 Posts - See Instagram photos and videos from Cora Diamond (@hostleague.rud.3).

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Cora Diamond shared a photo on Instagram: “Be a girl with a mind, a woman with attitude, and a lady with class. Likes, 1 Comments - Cora Diamond (@coradiamond) on Instagram: “Over n out Photo by Cora Diamond in The Taphouse Bar & Restaurant. Likes, Comments - Cora Diamond (@cora_diamond) on Instagram: “Keep your heels, head and standards high!

Add content to this section using the sidebar. From Everyday To Wedding Worthy. Coveted by many, meet our best selling earring now available in 16 gemstone and metal options. My sister Sabrina embodies what so pretty means to me. Whether it's for yourself or your loved ones we pride ourselves on making sentimental keepsakes to mark special moments and connections in your life ".

Affordable luxury jewelry thoughtfully and ethically crafted without compromise to create pieces which are timeless, one of a kind and durable. We are proudly a female founded Canadian luxury brand! We love being a part of the community and are committed to partnering with local charities and like minded businesses. Watch Cara's journey to India, her love of handcrafted jewelry and behind the scenes moments. Get inspiration on how we style our pieces, see behind the scenes in our design studio, storefront, and with our makers.

Also see exciting collection launches, collaborations and exciting daily news. New Arrivals. Shop Type. Shop By Name. Shop By Stone. Build Your Own. Gift Cards. Customer Service. Search 0 Cart. Search our shop. Entering this season coming off a dismal campaign, the Red Sox had limited expectations. Game 2: Friday, Oct. Rays, p.

Game 3: Sunday, Oct. Red Sox, p. Game 4 if necessary : Monday, Oct. Game 5 if necessary : Wednesday, Oct. The ALDS is played in a format where the team with the better regular season record gets home field for Games 1, 2 and 5. Petersburg, Fla. All games can be streamed on MLB. TV, FoxSports.

Viewers can also check out the series on FuboTV free trial. Baz won a silver medal at the Tokyo Olympics in August before getting called up to the majors in September. He made three starts at the end of the season, going with a 2.

Fluorescence is the phenomenon of colour change caused by the exposure to UV light. Phosphorescence means that this change continues to be seen for a certain period beyond exposure to UV light. All pink and red spinels, rubies and pink sapphires fluoresce an intense red colour. A small number of yellow sapphires turn orange and only a few blue sapphires can turn red. Brown diamonds usually fluoresce white and most yellow and white diamonds fluoresce blue when exposed to UV light.

However, Sheibani finds fluorescence to be a positive quality that adds an interesting and hidden dimension that makes it more unique. For our exhibition Glow , all of the jewellery has been designed with special consideration given to how the colours will appear in both normal and UV lighting.

The Glow jewels have an extra dimension to them that can be cherished by the wearer and enjoyed at will, with the help of a light. In true Sheibani style, the works are completely design driven and manufactured to the highest quality, mostly in Switzerland, but also in France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Her unique works are either abstract or inspired by playful objects with interesting shapes and infused with her love of colour. Upon reflec- tion, Sheibani feels that it is perhaps her passion for colour that led her to explore and bring to the foreground the neon side of certain gemstones. She has designed brand new works for the exhibition and has also created a selection of new pieces including her cupcake rings, rain cloud brooches and flowering cacti bracelets relat- ing to her previous collections.

A section of the exhibition will resemble a mini retrospective of her works of the past 15 years, enhanced by a neon glow. A brooch inspired by skyscraper blocks will sit neatly beside another resembling a rain cloud; both of which will include glowing blue diamonds, representing windows and rain.

The exhibition will travel to New York in May and will be presented alongside a selection of Louisa Guin- ness Gallery artist jewellery in the Colnaghi Gallery from 16th May — 23rd May. The show will exhibit some new pieces by Cora Sheibani which are not included in the London exhibition. A separate press release to cover this will follow.

I have long been an admirer of her style and design skills and am a collector of her work myself. The time and care she puts into the production of each piece is exemplary and the quality speaks for itself. I love the playful designs which use vintage copper cake moulds and ice cream cones as subject matters, I adore the clouds with rain drops of diamonds sprayed across the facade. The wire cage rings and pendants which imprison bright gemstones, the pretzel gold chain, the frame brooches, all such simple subjects but depicted so elegantly in original yet timeless design.

I have mostly worked with artists who are painters or sculptors; this solo exhibition adds a new layer to the gallery by extending its following and representation. With this exhibition we represent a young talented designer who speaks through her jewellery as an artist might otherwise do on canvas. Cora Sheibani was born on March 9th, to Christina and Bruno Bischofberger, a prominent art dealer in Switzerland. From an early age, she benefited from an environment dedicated to modern and contemporary art and design.

She lives in London with her husband and three children. In January , whilst studying at NYU, Cora Sheibani decided that she wanted to design jewellery and started her first jewellery sketchbook. In the summer of she completed a degree in gemmology from the GIA in London.

She started out by making small groups of work and individual pieces, each unique. Cora Sheibani continues to make single jewels while occasionally putting together a whole collection. In , she published a book of her Valence collection, with text by Ettore Sottsass, who one of her early supporters and influences.

The collection was a series of unique pieces made of gold wire. Since then she has made many other pieces using wire to create voluminous pieces and often incorporating precious gems. These pieces are inspired by the shapes and graphic designs of baked goods and copper moulds. Cora published a cookbook to accompany this collection that includes actual recipes.

I wound up with an honors degree in , but thanks to economics and philosophy, not thanks to the mathematics. Then I went off to start doing economics as a graduate student at MIT. I did economics because you can earn a living doing that. So, in addition to whatever economics I was doing that year, I went to a seminar that Paul «Iride», a. XXVI, n. I also went to a class on political philosophy, taught by Morton White. That was my first year at MIT. I wanted to do philosophy; but at that time, it was not clear how I was going to get financed for a year or even more of philosophy.

I also wanted to go to Oxford. This was partly because I possibly had a quite romantic view of what Oxford was, partly based on reading Stephen Leacock. I worked on some of the enormous old computers that they had in those days; I was essentially in the development stage of what became the IBM computer, doing the debugging program.

I was accepted at Oxford at St. In what kind of program did you enroll, at Oxford? At first, I started a second undergraduate program, in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. But at the end of the first term, Mary Warnock, who was then my tutor, asked me whether I wanted to switch to the B. After I switched to the B. I am actually struck by how lucky I was in various ways to be able to get into philosophy, beginning with the fact of its being extremely affordable to study at UK universities at that time.

I could totally manage two years at Oxford — including both tuition which was really tiny and living expenses — with the savings from one year of work in the US. The ease with which I got into the B. Bachelor in Philosophy is a two-year graduate degree.

At that time, most philosophy teachers in the UK, including many of the tutors at Oxford, did not have a Ph. The B. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit way of applications that had all been officially dealt with by the spring of the previous year. The sociology of academic philosophy, we might say, was then very different from what it is today.

One can think of academic philosophy today in countries such as the US or the UK as a big rationalized international business, whereas in the UK then it was more like a small family firm.

I should also mention that the structure of the B. In that distant past, when the B. You passed or you failed. In this respect, it was then a fairly scary sort of degree: if you failed at the end of the two-year course, that was that. There was no second chance, and most years a certain number of people did fail. Everyone knew very good people who had failed. Now you are «continuously» assessed, as the Oxford website puts it. You submit one essay after the end of the first term plus the vacation , then two more at the beginning of each of the next three terms, and then the thesis at the end of the sixth term.

And you are having tutorials and supervisions and whatnot on a set schedule. There are no exams. I had two terms of tutorials with Paul Grice, and occasional meetings with Ryle. And then was dumped into the exams. And what you did on the exams might or might not really draw on what you had done in your tutorials.

Probably people in my position would simply not be regarded as admissible. What was it like to study philosophy at Oxford in those years? The whole Oxford system had been strongly influenced by the model of classical education as background. Tony Woozley, to whom I was married, had that kind of classical education and he told me that he basically stopped doing anything else but Latin and Greek when he was seven or eight. He would of course read, say, D. Lawrence and all the sorts of thing that people were interested in at that time.

You were expected to be intellectually alive; but the education involved reading ancient texts and writing in those ancient languages, so that, for example, you would be asked to take a passage of contemporary English poetry and set it over into Latin. This classical background was important for the study of philosophy, I think, because language was taken very seriously as subject. These were people who could not assume that something that you said in one language would have an obvious translation into another language.

They were aware of relations between languages that went deep; and I think that that, actually, is reflected in the kinds of ways in which they went on to do philosophy, even when it was a very different sort of philosophy. Tony, for example, did philosophy of law, but I think that his understanding of philosophy of law was shaped by such things as his knowledge of the complexity of words for things such as «voluntarily» in Greek.

There was also the tradition of the Oxford tutorial system. You wrote an essay every week for each tutorial that you were doing, and then it was totally shredded by your tutor. During my first semester in the Philosophy, Politics, and Economics undergraduate program, I was actually doing two tutorials — one in ethics and one in politics — and so I was writing two essays every week.

In particular: if you said, for example, that Hume thought such-and-such, your tutor would say: «Where does he say that? Prove it! As I mentioned earlier, when I switched to the B. One thing I would like to emphasize about that education is that it is not a situation in which thinking of philosophy as a kind of science is a temptation. Among the people who were active when I was at Oxford, one very important person who stands out as somewhat separate from the others is A.

He had exactly the sort of classical English education that I have described, at Winchester. That was a very important book in dividing a generation then. However, Ayer was actually part of the original circle of people discussing with Austin; the original pre-war group of ordinary language philosophers did include Ayer. Were you expected to be an «ordinary language philosopher»? But in the years I was in Oxford, he was already becoming quite critical of ordinary language philosophy.

What you were very much expected to do, was to be able to think about a question even if it was just thrown at you. With the tutorial system, this was a necessity, given that you had only a few days for writing each of your essays. You were of course doing a fair amount of reading, but you were mainly working with the texts themselves, rather than with the secondary literature.

So it was a nice combination of being pushed to think quickly about a question, without knowing that much about the secondary literature, while being very closely engaged with the primary text. Thinking quickly about a question also went with the way the examination system there worked. You might have a question on the examination that in fact had been discussed in the literature; but it was important for them that you could give a good answer in the time you had, even though you had never seen that literature.

The examinations for fellowships at All Souls are also interesting in this respect. The fellowship allowed you to pursue research essentially free from any obligations for some years. Most of the fellows were either in philosophy or law. It was a very big thing to get. You got this fellowship by taking an examination, 2 A.

To give you just an example of a recent question: «What are museums for? In some of his late writings, Bernard Williams defends a conception of philosophy as a «humanistic discipline»; this really seems to reflect the way he was brought up at Oxford.

Williams was not at Oxford when I was there—I think he had gone off to London. I think I might have first seen him at one of the joint sessions of «Mind» and «The Aristotelian Society».

He was, in a way, the classic product of the Oxford system. He was faster in thinking well on his feet than anybody else! He did very much come through that system, and it is certainly something which left a lasting mark on the way he understood philosophy as a humanistic discipline and on the way he took himself to be capable of learning from the conceptual mode of thinking of the Greeks, precisely because they are in many significant ways different from us.

Do you think that coming from Oxford specifically made a difference for your intellectual development? I think it did, in many ways. There is a sense in which I am still a product of that system.

I had that philosophical education, and — partly for that reason — I am less of an American philosopher than someone like Stanley Cavell or Jim Conant. I think it also matters though I am not sure how that I did not do a Ph. This is part of my not having the background that American philosophers all have.

There is a sense in which the «Oxford time» does shape the kinds of ways in which you see philosophy as something you are doing, something you are teaching, how you are trying to get your students to work, what gets you angry when you see it in your students, and so on. How were they perceived? Hare, of whom they were all critical in different ways , is reputed to have said that «the women were after him».

For whatever reason, it is true that the women at Oxford that you mentioned put forth criticisms of Hare that I do not associate with any of the men philosophers of that time.

Was it important for you to meet these great women philosophers, given that the discipline, even today, is still largely dominated by men? I think that the importance of the first three women that you mentioned namely Anscombe, Murdoch, and Foot for my self-conception as a woman in philosophy is sort of hard to judge. With regard to Iris Murdoch, some of the people in my college invited her to a dinner, so we got to know her a little there.

The woman philosopher I had the closest relationship to was Mary Warnock, 3 G. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, , pp. In fact we were living in the same house, because I rented a room up at the top of her house. I do know that for somebody like Jenny Teichman, who spoke to me about this explicitly, it was especially important to have met a person like Elizabeth Anscombe, who was at the same time a married woman, the mother of children, and a philosopher.

But I think all of us could see these really interesting and important women in philosophy, and this certainly had an effect. How did you first become interested in Wittgenstein? I had a number of different encounters with Wittgenstein, which really came to very little over the years until considerably later. As an undergraduate, I did a seminar at Swarthmore on symbolic logic, taught by Michael Scriven, which focused on the history of the foundations of mathematics.

I probably wrote a paper on that book, but I really had no idea of what was going on. My first year of teaching was as a temporary replacement for Peter Winch at the University College of Swansea.

I used his room in the Arts Building, which was full of miscellaneous papers, many of which were very Wittgensteinian. The other people at Swansea were working in a very Wittgensteinian way. Rush Rhees and Roy Holland were there, and Howard Mounce was a graduate student, very active in the department colloquia. So there were all these Wittgensteinians, but I could not see the point of what they were doing; it did not make much sense to me.

My year at Swansea certainly did not make me a Swansea philosopher. When I was deciding what I was to be doing the following year, it turned out to be possible for me to have another year at Swansea, since Roy Holland was going away; but I had an offer of what we would call here in America a «tenure track» position at Sussex, and I took it.

At Sussex, Wittgenstein came into view in a quite different way. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit Ivor Hunt, who was down on the ground outside; he was shouting that there was the most beautiful article by Stanley Cavell that had just come out in «The Philosophical Review» and that I needed to go and read it at once, as it were.

I read that piece and I discussed it with Michael Feldman, who was my first husband. Perhaps I should say something about Michael at this point. A lot of the philosophical discussions that I was having during those years did involve Michael. I met Michael during my first year at Oxford. At that time, he had done a philosophy degree as an undergraduate at Oxford and he was supposedly signed up for a D.

He was also writing a novel. We got together and when I went out to teach at Swansea, we lived together in the countryside outside of the town. When Hunt announced the piece by Cavell, we both read and discussed it, and we thought that we really did need to come to understand something about Wittgenstein. The episode with Ivor Hunt would have been, I think, in the autumn of The following year I moved from Sussex to Aberdeen. But after my second year in Aberdeen, and this is now the summer of , Michael and I decided that, if we were going to learn about Wittgenstein, we needed to start with the Tractatus.

We were going to spend the summer — three months — in Norway, in a hut on a lake… Like Wittgenstein! Yes, but the reason for this had nothing to do with Wittgenstein. The place that we rented near Aberdeen was not available in the summer, so we needed to move out. We left all our belongings at the University and looked for a place to go. The hut in Norway seemed a nice place. It is on a tiny little ridge on a slope, and when he left the hut to someone else, the first thing they did was to move 8 S.

It was an excellent hut if what you want is to be Wittgenstein and sit around and think; but it was not a good hut for much of anything else. That was when I first really got to Wittgenstein.

The following summer, we took with us the Investigations. I certainly felt interested in Wittgenstein. My piece on secondary sense10 was published in the «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society» in ; I was reading the Tractatus and the Investigations in the summer of and , and you can certainly see what I am doing with both of those works in that paper of mine.

There were two ancestors of the secondary sense paper. In , I gave a reply to a paper on self-deception by Michael Clark, who was a colleague of mine at Aberdeen. I think it must have been a meeting of the Scots Philosophical Club. Then, having done that reply on self-deception, I wrote another piece, which I have never done anything with, on self-deception and duties to self. I was treating both of those as secondary senses, in one case of «deception» and in the other case of «duty».

That is where my ideas on secondary sense first got formulated. None of us knew terribly much about Wittgenstein, and besides the three of us, it 9 G. Diamond, Secondary Sense , reprinted in Ead. Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge, Mass. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit might have been one or two students. So it was a very nice opportunity to work through the material.

The other essay of mine that comes from the Sixties is the piece on Dummett and the philosophy of mathematics I sent it off to «Mind», but Ryle did not want it: he said they did not want to publish an historical piece. I sent it to «Philosophical Review», I guess, and got turned down.

So I never did anything with that paper for many years. But I did send it to Rhees at some point around that time. Before he gave a talk to his students, Wittgenstein would, in the week before, write down ideas. Rhees had also copies of the notes that Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald had taken at those classes.

We did quite a lot of work on that project. Then we had the idea of getting Alice Ambrose involved. At some point when we were working on the material, Rhees gave me material from and asked me whether I thought there was anything to be done with it.

These were student notes from lectures on the philosophy of mathematics. There were four different sets of notes.

It was not clear what one could do with them. I had no idea what to do with the notes that Rhees handed over to me. The same remarks would come up in different orders and phrased in different ways. It was very hard to see that you could make any sort of single account out of it. That material was actually similar to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology that Peter Geach published Geach decided to publish each version of the notes he had; but if you look at 11 C.

Diamond, The Face of Necessity, in Ead. Ambrose ed. Geach ed. I first started playing around with the material. You have four people, taking notes, coming up with things that are very different. One of them, R. So I had the actual shorthand notes he took, plus his own edited version. So I had all this different material and it took me really quite a long time to begin to figure out how I could put it together.

Eventually, I got a technique of working. I would take a passage of perhaps ten minutes and I would set out each of the four versions on parallel columns, using colors to mark the correspondences between the different versions. So, for example, I had on one column a passage in red followed by a passage in yellow; on another column, I had the yellow passage first; on yet another column, possibly, I had only the red passage.

I gradually came to have some kind of sense of what Wittgenstein might have said that yielded these four different versions. That was certainly important to the way I came to know Wittgenstein. I believe I had a complete draft of this material by the summer of Rhees was involved in trying to find a publisher. He was reluctant to try Blackwell, because he thought Elizabeth Anscombe would be against it, and Blackwell would decide whatever Elizabeth would decide.

There is a sense in which this went on behind her back. But the copyrights of the material I edited had nothing to do with the executors. The copyright of the lecture notes is in the lecture notes takers. So we went to Cornell as the original publisher.

Cornell, eventually — and rather stupidly, I think — let it go out of print. At that point, they sent me the copyrights and I asked Chicago whether they were interested.

Diamond ed. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit dismissed as rather amateurish. I am not deep in contemporary issues in philosophy of mathematics, the way somebody like Juliet Floyd or Hilary Putnam is. One of the aspects of the lectures on the foundations of mathematics that was very important for me is the discussion of proof: the significance of the fact that there may be many proofs of the same proposition, what happens when a proposition first gets proved, whether this is an answer to a pre-existing question, and so on.

All this fed directly into my paper on riddles15, which I wrote in What led you to move back to the US? This happened gradually.

Michael and I came to Charlottesville to spend a year, with me as visitor at the University of Virginia. We came in , which was in the middle of the Vietnam War. It was a very tense time in many ways.

Every male student had some kind of question about how he was going to deal with the draft. I had one student, for example, who went off to some place where there was somebody who could set things up so that when you saw a blood-pressure device, your blood- pressure would go up; in this way, when you were examined for the draft, you would come out as having very high blood pressure, and you would get exempt.

This was one of the possibilities; other people were hoping to be conscientious objectors, and so on. But one definitely had the idea that the draft was an issue for every male student.

All the undergraduates at the University of Virginia were male at that time the University started to admit female students only in , under legal pressure , and the graduate students were to a large extent men.

Also, in the spring of that year, there was a student strike here in Virginia, in response to the Kent State shootings During the strike, my students met in the house that 15 C. Some unarmed students were protesting against the Cambodian Campaign, which Nixon had just announced. The Ohio National Guard fired on the students, killing four students and wounding nine others.

The episode was followed by a strike of four million students across the United States. It was a very fraught sort of time, and very interesting in its way. Also, my family was directly involved. During the spring, my sister and brother-in-law were here in Charlottesville as visitors.

It turned out that my brother-in-law had been thinking about organizing a hiding place for Daniel Berrigan17 out in the country here. My brother-in-law, Eqbal Ahmad, was at that time very much involved in the Catholic anti-war movement, including the Berrigan brothers, Dan and Philip Berrigan. At that time, Dan did things like suddenly appear and give a sermon in a church, in a totally unannounced way, and then disappear; Eqbal was helping to organize all of this.

My parents were away, but my sister and bother-in-law were there, as well as a whole bunch of other people who had to do with the anti-war movement. We were talking about the situation of Philip Berrigan, who was then in prison; in particular, we were discussing whether it should be said that he was depressed, or whether that would be insulting to the suffering that he was going through.

Just to give you a sense of the situation, all these people could not make any telephone call, because their phones would be tapped, so they would go out to use public telephones. And my family, especially my brother-in-law, was particularly involved in those issues. In the summer of , Michael and I went back to Scotland, and during that year my brother-in-law was charged with conspiracy to kidnap Henry Kissinger.

My brother-in-law came up with the following idea. Using their acquaintances in Washington, maybe they could get invited to a dinner party attended by Kissinger, and at the end of dinner, they would announce something like this: «Mr. So this was talked about. One of the people at the meeting was a nun, Elizabeth McAlister, who was in love with the priest Philip Berrigan.

They later got married, and had some young anti-war activists! She gave this note to a man called Boyd Douglas, asking him to bring it to Philip. She did not know that Douglas was a spy for the FBI. He was a prisoner in the same prison as Philip.

Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit lying kind of offence. He was allowed out of prison to take classes at Bucknell University. But that was the cover: actually, he was let out of prison to spy on the anti-war movement at Bucknell University. He was a real creep. Just to give you an idea, stories came out later that there were various women who were approached by him saying that he was dying of cancer and that the last thing he wanted to do was to sleep with them!

This is the sort of guy he was. Anyway, Douglas made a copy of the note that Elizabeth gave him and handed it over to the FBI before he gave it to Philip. In fact, nothing came out of that idea. But the letter was the basis for an indictment of seven or eight people, plus five or six un-indicted co-conspirators. What eventually happened was that the case went to trial in The prosecution made its case and the defense decided to make the claim that the prosecution had not created a case that was even good enough to try to answer.

On that basis, the case went to the jury and the jury then voted 10 to 2 for acquittal. At that point, the government had the option of starting a new trial. But they had already spent about a million dollars to get, without any defense being offered, a 10 to 2 vote for acquittal.

In terms of whether it was worth going forward and trying again, they ultimately decided not to. So they dropped the case. But it was very frightening at the time because there was a huge government machinery that, as far as we knew, could have put Eqbal as well as all the other people involved in prison for years.

While Michael and I were in Scotland and all this was happening to my family, we received a phone call from Anthony Woozley, who was the chair of the department here at the University of Virginia, saying that it was possible for them to offer me a permanent position. They needed to know very quickly; in fact, we had essentially one day to decide. I think that our decision to move back was very much shaped by the fact that my brother-in-law was under indictment and that this was a very strange time for the United States.

Though I had been living in the UK for many years, I was very moved, during the time we were in Virginia the year before, by the way people were deeply involved and concerned about the war. So I accepted what was then a tenured associate professorship at the University of Virginia, starting in the fall of Obviously, that decision made a huge difference for my professional life, and eventually for my marriage with Michael.

Michael and I separated in the fall of , actually before I got together with Tony Woozley. I was in Charlottesville alone in , and then I spent a sabbatical year in the UK, first in Shetland and then in London.

It was during that year that Tony and I started writing to each other and eventually got together. I wrote the riddles paper, which I think was an important step in the development of my thought, during the summer of I wrote the paper in Shetland, in a little cottage in the middle of nowhere. I remember that I had only one copy of it. But in the meanwhile, I was very nervous about the situation and I kept the only copy of my paper in the loo, which was not part of the main building, thinking that if the house would burn down, I could still save the paper from the fire!

In those years, I also started to work on Frege, in relation to the question of nonsense. Frege and Nonsense18 was written around and came out in , in the volume in honor of Elizabeth Anscombe that Jenny Teichman and I edited19; the paper What Nonsense Might Be20, which is closely related, was also written in those years. Here I would like to mention another thing that was very important for me as the background of my thinking about Wittgenstein. In the late Seventies, I was also working on ethics.

The paper Eating Meat and Eating People23 comes roughly from that period. I think I gave a version of that paper in Warwick, during my sabbatical in Diamond, Frege and Nonsense , reprinted in Ead. Diamond and J. Teichman eds. Essays in Honour of G. Anscombe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder.

How to Read the Tractatus , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, The Reality of the Past , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, pp. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit How did you become interested in vegetarianism and animal ethics? Ah, animals! We meet in the winter of , and we gradually become interested in going out in the countryside around Oxford, looking at the flowers, looking at the birds, and so on. I finished my B. Michael and I and five or six other people rented a derelict chateau in southwest France.

We found out only later that in fact it had been used as an internment camp for Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany who were ultimately sent off to Auschwitz. So we were there, wandering around that wonderful countryside, having wonderful meals, and in that derelict chateau, the doves were flying back and forth through the broken windows. It was very lovely. The last night, just before we left, we had dinner at a local restaurant, and the patron served us pigeons.

We had been seeing and enjoying the pigeons, and now here are the pigeons; it was sort of… funny. That was one episode. Next stage in our life, we go to Swansea and we rent a little flat in a very old house, about ten miles out in the countryside. We lived on a slope of a large hill, where sheep were wandering about. As we were wandering about, the sheep were always there. Meat was extremely cheap at that time. We were having bacon for breakfast, and maybe kidneys for lunch, or brains on toast, and then mutton for dinner!

It was a very meaty kind of life that we were living. That was a decision. Somehow, the kinds of tensions that had been present in our lives issued in that decision.

He just felt: «No, enough of this». At this point, in , there are basically no vegetarians, there are no vegetarian restaurants, there are no vegetarian cookbooks, there is basically nothing.

It was not the way it is now. We did not know what we were going to do. How do you eat when your typical dish was potatoes, veggies, and meat, and now you take away meat, so that you have potatoes, veggies, space? We did go on eating fish for a while, which I think made a lot of sense given the way things were. But anyway we managed, and gradually got into cooking things without meat. I think the ways I have come to think about animals were originally shaped by conversations with Michael at that time.

I think one of the ideas that you get in Eating Meat and Eating People is that we have various concepts that come from our moral life with other people, and these concepts are given an application to animals.

That way of looking at things comes out of those discussions with Michael. In the early Seventies, there were books on vegetarianism coming out, but of a very different sort. So one source of my thinking about animals was the fact that Michael and I became vegetarians for reasons that had nothing to do with the philosophical situation, but with our personal situation: we became vegetarians, and then began thinking about it.

But also, what got into the mix was the presence of a way of thinking about vegetarianism that was very different. It was out of that mix that came Eating Meat and Eating People.

The essay Experimenting on Animals26 is also from that period. As I said, Michael and I became vegetarians in the early Sixties. A good friend of ours for many years, David Sperlinger, would come out to visit us and we often talked about vegetarianism. Eventually, he became a clinical psychologist and in the Seventies he invited me to a meeting of the British Psychological Association, where I read the Experimenting on Animals paper, at roughly the same time as I read the Eating Meat and Eating People paper in Warwick.

Was the discussion of animals and vegetarianism your first work in moral philosophy? Yes, except for the bit of material on ethics contained in the essay on secondary sense. I should also say that part of the reason I came to work on ethics had to do with my teaching. When I was at Swansea and Sussex, I was teaching stuff all over the map, including ethics. Aberdeen, like all the other ancient Scottish universities, had at that time a Moral Philosophy Department separate from what you might think of as a metaphysics and epistemology department, which they called the «Logic Department».

So, for example, when Tony was at St. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch and J. Harris eds. Diamond, Experimenting on Animals. A Problem in Ethics , reprinted in Ead. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit the knowledge of the Professor of Logic; it was through his doing that the Logic Department and the Moral Philosophy Department came to have a building that they shared and a single library.

When I was in Aberdeen, we did have a single library, and I taught several classes in the Logic Department; but the organization of especially the first two years of the undergraduate teaching was totally separate in Moral Philosophy and Logic. I taught Rousseau for years, I taught Hume, and I used to teach an advanced class on contemporary problems in ethics.

This is, I think, an important part of the background of my work in moral philosophy. Would you like to mention any other biographical event that had a significant impact on your philosophical development? The whole development of my collaboration with Jim Conant has obviously been very important over a good number of years.

I met Jim when he was a graduate student at Harvard, when I went there to give a talk. This would have been the mid Eighties. I presented a version of my paper Losing Your Concepts27, before it was actually published. I think Jim wrote me a letter after that. So we started to exchange letters, on actual pieces of paper — technologically, this was before you do nothing but emails.

Gradually, as the conversation developed, we did move into a combination of emails and phone calls; but the emails were quite useful because you could keep records of the exchanges. I had never specifically tried to deal with the Tractatus on ethics. The conversations I had with Jim motivated me to broach this topic, but at the same time showed me how difficult it was actually to say anything about what was… unsayable!

Those conversations with Jim toward the end of his Harvard career were very important and developed into a long-term collaboration over the years when he was a fellow at Michigan and then a professor at 27 C. Diamond, Losing Your Concepts, in «Ethics», 98 , pp. Crary and R. Read eds. We are obviously still in touch with each other, and have a lot of plans to do things together, and sometime maybe we will.

We have got one paper that we wrote together, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely29, but we would hope to do more. Rhees came to the class. He objected to a lot of what I was saying and put a lot of pressure on me. I was quite specifically interested in the ways in which you could give a sense to a proposition which did not have a sense.

Rhees, on the other hand, was trying to push me into looking at a quite different angle: questions about what different ways of saying the same thing had to have in common in order to be able to express that content, rather than questions concerning the ways in which you could use a single sign-combination to say different things. I propose to conclude here the more biographical part of the interview and move on to some questions more directly concerned with your philosophy.

In your first collection of essays, The Realistic Spirit, you introduce two notions that are central to your appropriation of Wittgenstein: the idea that in philosophy we tend to «lay down requirements» on how things must be, rather than looking at how things are; and the idea that in philosophy we should aim to look at things «in a realistic spirit» Now, if philosophy is to a considerable extent a struggle against the tendency to lay down requirements on our thought and experience, where does this tendency come from?

The tendency is certainly something that Wittgenstein saw as having been at work in his own earlier philosophizing. So this conception of how we go wrong in philosophy is certainly very important in understanding the difference between early and later Wittgenstein. Conant and C.

Diamond, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely. Weiss eds. See also the Italian collection of essays: J. Diamond, Rileggere Wittgenstein, edited by P.

Donatelli, with a Foreword by P. Donatelli and an Afterword by S. Bronzo, Roma, Carocci, Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit I am not sure how one would try to connect it up with other kinds of elements in our thought. The inclination is to say that it has to do with the «scientific spirit of the age», since in science we come to see something in common between phenomena — say the law of gravitation — that is explanatory.

Thus the tendency to lay down requirements in philosophy might be connected to a desire for explanation that we see satisfied by modern science. However, I am not sure it is correct to say that the tendency I talk about derives from the attempt to model philosophy on modern science.

Cora Diamond. IG - @coras_mobile_tanning. Posts 2k Followers 2k Following · Dry Jan come at me · @coradiamond. Dry Jan come at me. Instagram activity by @cora_diamond ( Cora ). Posts: - Similar Users: coradiamond, cora_diamond_backup, cora_diamonds, hostleague.rud.3, shauntayp'. Cora Diamond. @cora_diamond. ⚜Tattoomodel & Webcamgirl ⚜ Do what you love! I am the new one here.. If you wanna see private content, just subscribe. .

Notes to the individual essays are immediately attached to each as they appear, and the volume concludes with a combined name and subject index. All of the essays are valuable in their own right as worthwhile philosophical discussions of their particular topics.

I nevertheless found myself disappointed by the fact that the essays taught me relatively little in-depth about Diamond's philosophy. There are many ways of honoring a highly-regarded thinker, and certainly bringing together essays by persons who have been influenced by the individual's work is one tried and true method.

From my perspective, however, previously knowing something but not very much about Diamond's thought, I had hoped that the present volume would provide a window on her ideas, as the title seemed to promise, an introduction to be pursued thereafter, turning more assiduously to original writings after being prepared to understand Diamond's philosophy in perspective.

I expected a roadmap to point out places of interest in Diamond's work, with solid sharply-focused critical interaction to make the philosopher's opus come alive, calling attention to attractions and hazards en route, to wonders and difficulties that might otherwise go unnoticed or under-appreciated.

Crary's Introduction goes some distance toward this goal, but the essays by and large do not. The authors in virtually every instance pay lip service at some point to Diamond as someone whose seminal writings on this or that exegetical or philosophical problem have had an impact on their own thinking, or with whom they have discussed related ideas in the past, and then proceed to ride their own hobbyhorses to the end of the essay on whatever subject other than Diamond Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson, Fontane, etc.

Here, as befits a review of such a diverse collection of philosophical essays, are some highly impressionistic impressions that cannot pretend to do justice to any of the individual essays. The usual reasons of space forbid my discussing all of the papers individually, by which I mean no disapproval by neglect. I concentrate instead on those that I think bear the most criticism, rather than squandering my word allotment in paltry synopsis. Thus, I pass over with little or no comment some of my favorite papers in the collection, especially those of Floyd, Lovibond, and Mulhall.

Part I Wittgenstein. Conant, taking inspiration years ago from Diamond's groundbreaking essay, 'Throwing Away the Ladder', has led the charge of 'resolute' interpreters of Wittgenstein's early philosophy in the Tractatus.

Conant's essay, which we can take with due disclaimers as representative of this section, weighs in at pages including extensive notes. Conant frames religious analogies of the Tractatus Old Testament and Philosophical Investigations and other posthumata New Testament with fabricated quotations from a fictional Johannes Climacus, pirating Kierkegaard's pseudonym, in order to talk about the positions developed in his own essay from an ironic, third-person perspective.

Within this quasi-literary format, Conant repackages 'New Wittgensteinian' ideas about the Tractatus with which he is affiliated.

Interesting new twists are nevertheless woven into the mix as Conant considers a succession of lists of theses that might be attributed to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus , together with what Conant extrapolates as Wittgenstein's imagined later reactions to them. The issue, or one of them anyway, in trying to understand the relation between the two main periods of Wittgenstein's lifework, is that if the later Wittgenstein rejects what the early Wittgenstein wrote, especially about meaning and the constellation of associated topics, as he certainly seems to do in Philosophical Investigations , Philosophical Grammar and Philosophical Remarks from The Big Typescript , then it would appear that either the early Wittgenstein was trying after all to advance meaningful theses capable of being denied anon, or else at least that the later Wittgenstein takes himself to have previously done so.

Since both possibilities argue against resolute readings of the Tractatus as Wittgenstein's effort to do away with all attempts at philosophical discourse as irredeemably meaningless, as certain critics of the New Wittgensteinians have argued, the topic has special urgency for their approach.

Pros and cons of resolute or non-chickening-out readings of the Tractatus notwithstanding, I am troubled by the fact that in 6. To my way of thinking, this does not merely suggest but fully implies that it is literally nonsensical for Wittgenstein also to have written that his propositions are literally nonsensical. It is hard for me accordingly to understand how anyone could intelligibly adopt a resolute reading of 6. For the passage also pulls the rug out from under itself as equally unsinnig as the rest of the text.

A resolute, non-chickening-out reading of 6. Must not a resolutist, then, trying to be resolute in particular about the implications of passage 6. These are mysteries that the resolutists, at least in the present venue, do not venture to resolve.

Still, the New Wittgensteinians, following Diamond, and with Conant among others manifestly at the helm, have done an invaluable service in calling attention to previously unremarked difficulties in understanding the real message of Wittgenstein's Tractatus , and of the too frequently underestimated pitfalls of reading the text without keeping 6.

Ultimately, though, I find Conant's distinctions and range of alternative approaches to the text far too limiting, despite his efforts to work out a variety of resolutist heterodoxies, including mild, severe, and zealous mono-Wittgensteinianisms like different versions of monotheism, following the religious conceit Conant playfully develops throughout the essay.

The distinction between resolute and irresolute readings of the Tractatus strikes me as especially cartoonish, a set of false alternatives. Wittgenstein's early treatise presents itself as something more like a work of medieval mysticism, describing a course of thought or way of life that the sage or saint has had to work through over time and finally surpassed or triumphed against, arriving at ineffable insights amounting to a revelation.

The ladder metaphor in 6. Bertrand Russell asked a pacing young Wittgenstein in his room whether he was thinking about logic or his sins, to which Wittgenstein characteristically answered, 'Both' Russell, Autobiography , Chapter 9. If Conant's fundamental distinction among interpretations is correct, however, then categorizing Wittgenstein's early philosophy as ineffable belongs exclusively to the irresolute, chickening-out approach to reading the thornier passages of the Tractatus.

I am amazed, finally, to discover that resolutists who want to be faithful to Wittgenstein's conclusions in Tractatus 6. It appears that in order to be resolute, to avoid chickening out in the effort to be consistently loyal to Wittgenstein's insight that 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', a philosophical commentator must be inexhaustibly prolix. To understand Wittgenstein, one cannot practice what one preaches; the resolute interpreter of Wittgenstein cannot be a consistent committed Wittgensteinian by his or her own lights, but must enter the fray as an outsider, a non- or even anti-Wittgensteinian.

If we are convinced that Wittgenstein advocates silence instead of meaningless prattle about philosophical problems, should we not be silent about the need to be silent? Is that not what Wittgenstein did when he abandoned philosophy for primary school teaching in the Alps? That was a very important book in dividing a generation then.

However, Ayer was actually part of the original circle of people discussing with Austin; the original pre-war group of ordinary language philosophers did include Ayer. Were you expected to be an «ordinary language philosopher»?

But in the years I was in Oxford, he was already becoming quite critical of ordinary language philosophy. What you were very much expected to do, was to be able to think about a question even if it was just thrown at you. With the tutorial system, this was a necessity, given that you had only a few days for writing each of your essays.

You were of course doing a fair amount of reading, but you were mainly working with the texts themselves, rather than with the secondary literature. So it was a nice combination of being pushed to think quickly about a question, without knowing that much about the secondary literature, while being very closely engaged with the primary text.

Thinking quickly about a question also went with the way the examination system there worked. You might have a question on the examination that in fact had been discussed in the literature; but it was important for them that you could give a good answer in the time you had, even though you had never seen that literature.

The examinations for fellowships at All Souls are also interesting in this respect. The fellowship allowed you to pursue research essentially free from any obligations for some years.

Most of the fellows were either in philosophy or law. It was a very big thing to get. You got this fellowship by taking an examination, 2 A.

To give you just an example of a recent question: «What are museums for? In some of his late writings, Bernard Williams defends a conception of philosophy as a «humanistic discipline»; this really seems to reflect the way he was brought up at Oxford.

Williams was not at Oxford when I was there—I think he had gone off to London. I think I might have first seen him at one of the joint sessions of «Mind» and «The Aristotelian Society». He was, in a way, the classic product of the Oxford system. He was faster in thinking well on his feet than anybody else! He did very much come through that system, and it is certainly something which left a lasting mark on the way he understood philosophy as a humanistic discipline and on the way he took himself to be capable of learning from the conceptual mode of thinking of the Greeks, precisely because they are in many significant ways different from us.

Do you think that coming from Oxford specifically made a difference for your intellectual development? I think it did, in many ways. There is a sense in which I am still a product of that system. I had that philosophical education, and — partly for that reason — I am less of an American philosopher than someone like Stanley Cavell or Jim Conant. I think it also matters though I am not sure how that I did not do a Ph.

This is part of my not having the background that American philosophers all have. There is a sense in which the «Oxford time» does shape the kinds of ways in which you see philosophy as something you are doing, something you are teaching, how you are trying to get your students to work, what gets you angry when you see it in your students, and so on.

How were they perceived? Hare, of whom they were all critical in different ways , is reputed to have said that «the women were after him». For whatever reason, it is true that the women at Oxford that you mentioned put forth criticisms of Hare that I do not associate with any of the men philosophers of that time. Was it important for you to meet these great women philosophers, given that the discipline, even today, is still largely dominated by men? I think that the importance of the first three women that you mentioned namely Anscombe, Murdoch, and Foot for my self-conception as a woman in philosophy is sort of hard to judge.

With regard to Iris Murdoch, some of the people in my college invited her to a dinner, so we got to know her a little there. The woman philosopher I had the closest relationship to was Mary Warnock, 3 G.

Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, Oxford, Blackwell, , pp. In fact we were living in the same house, because I rented a room up at the top of her house. I do know that for somebody like Jenny Teichman, who spoke to me about this explicitly, it was especially important to have met a person like Elizabeth Anscombe, who was at the same time a married woman, the mother of children, and a philosopher. But I think all of us could see these really interesting and important women in philosophy, and this certainly had an effect.

How did you first become interested in Wittgenstein? I had a number of different encounters with Wittgenstein, which really came to very little over the years until considerably later.

As an undergraduate, I did a seminar at Swarthmore on symbolic logic, taught by Michael Scriven, which focused on the history of the foundations of mathematics. I probably wrote a paper on that book, but I really had no idea of what was going on. My first year of teaching was as a temporary replacement for Peter Winch at the University College of Swansea. I used his room in the Arts Building, which was full of miscellaneous papers, many of which were very Wittgensteinian.

The other people at Swansea were working in a very Wittgensteinian way. Rush Rhees and Roy Holland were there, and Howard Mounce was a graduate student, very active in the department colloquia. So there were all these Wittgensteinians, but I could not see the point of what they were doing; it did not make much sense to me. My year at Swansea certainly did not make me a Swansea philosopher. When I was deciding what I was to be doing the following year, it turned out to be possible for me to have another year at Swansea, since Roy Holland was going away; but I had an offer of what we would call here in America a «tenure track» position at Sussex, and I took it.

At Sussex, Wittgenstein came into view in a quite different way. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit Ivor Hunt, who was down on the ground outside; he was shouting that there was the most beautiful article by Stanley Cavell that had just come out in «The Philosophical Review» and that I needed to go and read it at once, as it were. I read that piece and I discussed it with Michael Feldman, who was my first husband. Perhaps I should say something about Michael at this point. A lot of the philosophical discussions that I was having during those years did involve Michael.

I met Michael during my first year at Oxford. At that time, he had done a philosophy degree as an undergraduate at Oxford and he was supposedly signed up for a D. He was also writing a novel. We got together and when I went out to teach at Swansea, we lived together in the countryside outside of the town. When Hunt announced the piece by Cavell, we both read and discussed it, and we thought that we really did need to come to understand something about Wittgenstein.

The episode with Ivor Hunt would have been, I think, in the autumn of The following year I moved from Sussex to Aberdeen. But after my second year in Aberdeen, and this is now the summer of , Michael and I decided that, if we were going to learn about Wittgenstein, we needed to start with the Tractatus. We were going to spend the summer — three months — in Norway, in a hut on a lake… Like Wittgenstein! Yes, but the reason for this had nothing to do with Wittgenstein.

The place that we rented near Aberdeen was not available in the summer, so we needed to move out. We left all our belongings at the University and looked for a place to go. The hut in Norway seemed a nice place. It is on a tiny little ridge on a slope, and when he left the hut to someone else, the first thing they did was to move 8 S. It was an excellent hut if what you want is to be Wittgenstein and sit around and think; but it was not a good hut for much of anything else.

That was when I first really got to Wittgenstein. The following summer, we took with us the Investigations. I certainly felt interested in Wittgenstein.

My piece on secondary sense10 was published in the «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society» in ; I was reading the Tractatus and the Investigations in the summer of and , and you can certainly see what I am doing with both of those works in that paper of mine.

There were two ancestors of the secondary sense paper. In , I gave a reply to a paper on self-deception by Michael Clark, who was a colleague of mine at Aberdeen. I think it must have been a meeting of the Scots Philosophical Club. Then, having done that reply on self-deception, I wrote another piece, which I have never done anything with, on self-deception and duties to self.

I was treating both of those as secondary senses, in one case of «deception» and in the other case of «duty». That is where my ideas on secondary sense first got formulated.

None of us knew terribly much about Wittgenstein, and besides the three of us, it 9 G. Diamond, Secondary Sense , reprinted in Ead. Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.

Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit might have been one or two students. So it was a very nice opportunity to work through the material.

The other essay of mine that comes from the Sixties is the piece on Dummett and the philosophy of mathematics I sent it off to «Mind», but Ryle did not want it: he said they did not want to publish an historical piece. I sent it to «Philosophical Review», I guess, and got turned down. So I never did anything with that paper for many years.

But I did send it to Rhees at some point around that time. Before he gave a talk to his students, Wittgenstein would, in the week before, write down ideas.

Rhees had also copies of the notes that Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald had taken at those classes. We did quite a lot of work on that project. Then we had the idea of getting Alice Ambrose involved. At some point when we were working on the material, Rhees gave me material from and asked me whether I thought there was anything to be done with it.

These were student notes from lectures on the philosophy of mathematics. There were four different sets of notes. It was not clear what one could do with them. I had no idea what to do with the notes that Rhees handed over to me. The same remarks would come up in different orders and phrased in different ways. It was very hard to see that you could make any sort of single account out of it. That material was actually similar to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology that Peter Geach published Geach decided to publish each version of the notes he had; but if you look at 11 C.

Diamond, The Face of Necessity, in Ead. Ambrose ed. Geach ed. I first started playing around with the material. You have four people, taking notes, coming up with things that are very different.

One of them, R. So I had the actual shorthand notes he took, plus his own edited version. So I had all this different material and it took me really quite a long time to begin to figure out how I could put it together. Eventually, I got a technique of working.

I would take a passage of perhaps ten minutes and I would set out each of the four versions on parallel columns, using colors to mark the correspondences between the different versions. So, for example, I had on one column a passage in red followed by a passage in yellow; on another column, I had the yellow passage first; on yet another column, possibly, I had only the red passage.

I gradually came to have some kind of sense of what Wittgenstein might have said that yielded these four different versions. That was certainly important to the way I came to know Wittgenstein. I believe I had a complete draft of this material by the summer of Rhees was involved in trying to find a publisher.

He was reluctant to try Blackwell, because he thought Elizabeth Anscombe would be against it, and Blackwell would decide whatever Elizabeth would decide. There is a sense in which this went on behind her back. But the copyrights of the material I edited had nothing to do with the executors.

The copyright of the lecture notes is in the lecture notes takers. So we went to Cornell as the original publisher. Cornell, eventually — and rather stupidly, I think — let it go out of print. At that point, they sent me the copyrights and I asked Chicago whether they were interested.

Diamond ed. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit dismissed as rather amateurish. I am not deep in contemporary issues in philosophy of mathematics, the way somebody like Juliet Floyd or Hilary Putnam is. One of the aspects of the lectures on the foundations of mathematics that was very important for me is the discussion of proof: the significance of the fact that there may be many proofs of the same proposition, what happens when a proposition first gets proved, whether this is an answer to a pre-existing question, and so on.

All this fed directly into my paper on riddles15, which I wrote in What led you to move back to the US? This happened gradually. Michael and I came to Charlottesville to spend a year, with me as visitor at the University of Virginia. We came in , which was in the middle of the Vietnam War. It was a very tense time in many ways. Every male student had some kind of question about how he was going to deal with the draft.

I had one student, for example, who went off to some place where there was somebody who could set things up so that when you saw a blood-pressure device, your blood- pressure would go up; in this way, when you were examined for the draft, you would come out as having very high blood pressure, and you would get exempt.

This was one of the possibilities; other people were hoping to be conscientious objectors, and so on. But one definitely had the idea that the draft was an issue for every male student.

All the undergraduates at the University of Virginia were male at that time the University started to admit female students only in , under legal pressure , and the graduate students were to a large extent men. Also, in the spring of that year, there was a student strike here in Virginia, in response to the Kent State shootings During the strike, my students met in the house that 15 C.

Some unarmed students were protesting against the Cambodian Campaign, which Nixon had just announced. The Ohio National Guard fired on the students, killing four students and wounding nine others.

The episode was followed by a strike of four million students across the United States. It was a very fraught sort of time, and very interesting in its way. Also, my family was directly involved. During the spring, my sister and brother-in-law were here in Charlottesville as visitors. It turned out that my brother-in-law had been thinking about organizing a hiding place for Daniel Berrigan17 out in the country here.

My brother-in-law, Eqbal Ahmad, was at that time very much involved in the Catholic anti-war movement, including the Berrigan brothers, Dan and Philip Berrigan.

At that time, Dan did things like suddenly appear and give a sermon in a church, in a totally unannounced way, and then disappear; Eqbal was helping to organize all of this.

My parents were away, but my sister and bother-in-law were there, as well as a whole bunch of other people who had to do with the anti-war movement. We were talking about the situation of Philip Berrigan, who was then in prison; in particular, we were discussing whether it should be said that he was depressed, or whether that would be insulting to the suffering that he was going through.

Just to give you a sense of the situation, all these people could not make any telephone call, because their phones would be tapped, so they would go out to use public telephones. And my family, especially my brother-in-law, was particularly involved in those issues.

In the summer of , Michael and I went back to Scotland, and during that year my brother-in-law was charged with conspiracy to kidnap Henry Kissinger. My brother-in-law came up with the following idea. Using their acquaintances in Washington, maybe they could get invited to a dinner party attended by Kissinger, and at the end of dinner, they would announce something like this: «Mr. So this was talked about. One of the people at the meeting was a nun, Elizabeth McAlister, who was in love with the priest Philip Berrigan.

They later got married, and had some young anti-war activists! She gave this note to a man called Boyd Douglas, asking him to bring it to Philip. She did not know that Douglas was a spy for the FBI. He was a prisoner in the same prison as Philip. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit lying kind of offence.

He was allowed out of prison to take classes at Bucknell University. But that was the cover: actually, he was let out of prison to spy on the anti-war movement at Bucknell University. He was a real creep. Just to give you an idea, stories came out later that there were various women who were approached by him saying that he was dying of cancer and that the last thing he wanted to do was to sleep with them!

This is the sort of guy he was. Anyway, Douglas made a copy of the note that Elizabeth gave him and handed it over to the FBI before he gave it to Philip. In fact, nothing came out of that idea. But the letter was the basis for an indictment of seven or eight people, plus five or six un-indicted co-conspirators.

What eventually happened was that the case went to trial in The prosecution made its case and the defense decided to make the claim that the prosecution had not created a case that was even good enough to try to answer. On that basis, the case went to the jury and the jury then voted 10 to 2 for acquittal. At that point, the government had the option of starting a new trial. But they had already spent about a million dollars to get, without any defense being offered, a 10 to 2 vote for acquittal.

In terms of whether it was worth going forward and trying again, they ultimately decided not to. So they dropped the case. But it was very frightening at the time because there was a huge government machinery that, as far as we knew, could have put Eqbal as well as all the other people involved in prison for years. While Michael and I were in Scotland and all this was happening to my family, we received a phone call from Anthony Woozley, who was the chair of the department here at the University of Virginia, saying that it was possible for them to offer me a permanent position.

They needed to know very quickly; in fact, we had essentially one day to decide. I think that our decision to move back was very much shaped by the fact that my brother-in-law was under indictment and that this was a very strange time for the United States.

Though I had been living in the UK for many years, I was very moved, during the time we were in Virginia the year before, by the way people were deeply involved and concerned about the war. So I accepted what was then a tenured associate professorship at the University of Virginia, starting in the fall of Obviously, that decision made a huge difference for my professional life, and eventually for my marriage with Michael.

Michael and I separated in the fall of , actually before I got together with Tony Woozley. I was in Charlottesville alone in , and then I spent a sabbatical year in the UK, first in Shetland and then in London.

It was during that year that Tony and I started writing to each other and eventually got together. I wrote the riddles paper, which I think was an important step in the development of my thought, during the summer of I wrote the paper in Shetland, in a little cottage in the middle of nowhere. I remember that I had only one copy of it. But in the meanwhile, I was very nervous about the situation and I kept the only copy of my paper in the loo, which was not part of the main building, thinking that if the house would burn down, I could still save the paper from the fire!

In those years, I also started to work on Frege, in relation to the question of nonsense. Frege and Nonsense18 was written around and came out in , in the volume in honor of Elizabeth Anscombe that Jenny Teichman and I edited19; the paper What Nonsense Might Be20, which is closely related, was also written in those years.

Here I would like to mention another thing that was very important for me as the background of my thinking about Wittgenstein. In the late Seventies, I was also working on ethics. The paper Eating Meat and Eating People23 comes roughly from that period.

I think I gave a version of that paper in Warwick, during my sabbatical in Diamond, Frege and Nonsense , reprinted in Ead. Diamond and J. Teichman eds. Essays in Honour of G. Anscombe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder. How to Read the Tractatus , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, The Reality of the Past , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, pp. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit How did you become interested in vegetarianism and animal ethics? Ah, animals!

We meet in the winter of , and we gradually become interested in going out in the countryside around Oxford, looking at the flowers, looking at the birds, and so on. I finished my B. Michael and I and five or six other people rented a derelict chateau in southwest France. We found out only later that in fact it had been used as an internment camp for Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany who were ultimately sent off to Auschwitz.

So we were there, wandering around that wonderful countryside, having wonderful meals, and in that derelict chateau, the doves were flying back and forth through the broken windows.

It was very lovely. The last night, just before we left, we had dinner at a local restaurant, and the patron served us pigeons. We had been seeing and enjoying the pigeons, and now here are the pigeons; it was sort of… funny. That was one episode. Next stage in our life, we go to Swansea and we rent a little flat in a very old house, about ten miles out in the countryside.

We lived on a slope of a large hill, where sheep were wandering about. As we were wandering about, the sheep were always there. Meat was extremely cheap at that time. We were having bacon for breakfast, and maybe kidneys for lunch, or brains on toast, and then mutton for dinner! It was a very meaty kind of life that we were living. That was a decision. Somehow, the kinds of tensions that had been present in our lives issued in that decision.

He just felt: «No, enough of this». At this point, in , there are basically no vegetarians, there are no vegetarian restaurants, there are no vegetarian cookbooks, there is basically nothing. It was not the way it is now. We did not know what we were going to do. How do you eat when your typical dish was potatoes, veggies, and meat, and now you take away meat, so that you have potatoes, veggies, space? We did go on eating fish for a while, which I think made a lot of sense given the way things were.

But anyway we managed, and gradually got into cooking things without meat. I think the ways I have come to think about animals were originally shaped by conversations with Michael at that time. I think one of the ideas that you get in Eating Meat and Eating People is that we have various concepts that come from our moral life with other people, and these concepts are given an application to animals.

That way of looking at things comes out of those discussions with Michael. In the early Seventies, there were books on vegetarianism coming out, but of a very different sort. So one source of my thinking about animals was the fact that Michael and I became vegetarians for reasons that had nothing to do with the philosophical situation, but with our personal situation: we became vegetarians, and then began thinking about it.

But also, what got into the mix was the presence of a way of thinking about vegetarianism that was very different. It was out of that mix that came Eating Meat and Eating People. The essay Experimenting on Animals26 is also from that period. As I said, Michael and I became vegetarians in the early Sixties.

A good friend of ours for many years, David Sperlinger, would come out to visit us and we often talked about vegetarianism. Eventually, he became a clinical psychologist and in the Seventies he invited me to a meeting of the British Psychological Association, where I read the Experimenting on Animals paper, at roughly the same time as I read the Eating Meat and Eating People paper in Warwick.

Was the discussion of animals and vegetarianism your first work in moral philosophy? Yes, except for the bit of material on ethics contained in the essay on secondary sense. I should also say that part of the reason I came to work on ethics had to do with my teaching. When I was at Swansea and Sussex, I was teaching stuff all over the map, including ethics.

Aberdeen, like all the other ancient Scottish universities, had at that time a Moral Philosophy Department separate from what you might think of as a metaphysics and epistemology department, which they called the «Logic Department». So, for example, when Tony was at St. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch and J. Harris eds. Diamond, Experimenting on Animals. A Problem in Ethics , reprinted in Ead. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit the knowledge of the Professor of Logic; it was through his doing that the Logic Department and the Moral Philosophy Department came to have a building that they shared and a single library.

When I was in Aberdeen, we did have a single library, and I taught several classes in the Logic Department; but the organization of especially the first two years of the undergraduate teaching was totally separate in Moral Philosophy and Logic.

I taught Rousseau for years, I taught Hume, and I used to teach an advanced class on contemporary problems in ethics. This is, I think, an important part of the background of my work in moral philosophy. Would you like to mention any other biographical event that had a significant impact on your philosophical development?

The whole development of my collaboration with Jim Conant has obviously been very important over a good number of years. I met Jim when he was a graduate student at Harvard, when I went there to give a talk. This would have been the mid Eighties. I presented a version of my paper Losing Your Concepts27, before it was actually published. I think Jim wrote me a letter after that. So we started to exchange letters, on actual pieces of paper — technologically, this was before you do nothing but emails.

Gradually, as the conversation developed, we did move into a combination of emails and phone calls; but the emails were quite useful because you could keep records of the exchanges.

I had never specifically tried to deal with the Tractatus on ethics. The conversations I had with Jim motivated me to broach this topic, but at the same time showed me how difficult it was actually to say anything about what was… unsayable!

Those conversations with Jim toward the end of his Harvard career were very important and developed into a long-term collaboration over the years when he was a fellow at Michigan and then a professor at 27 C. Diamond, Losing Your Concepts, in «Ethics», 98 , pp. Crary and R. Read eds. We are obviously still in touch with each other, and have a lot of plans to do things together, and sometime maybe we will.

We have got one paper that we wrote together, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely29, but we would hope to do more. Rhees came to the class. He objected to a lot of what I was saying and put a lot of pressure on me. I was quite specifically interested in the ways in which you could give a sense to a proposition which did not have a sense.

Rhees, on the other hand, was trying to push me into looking at a quite different angle: questions about what different ways of saying the same thing had to have in common in order to be able to express that content, rather than questions concerning the ways in which you could use a single sign-combination to say different things.

I propose to conclude here the more biographical part of the interview and move on to some questions more directly concerned with your philosophy. In your first collection of essays, The Realistic Spirit, you introduce two notions that are central to your appropriation of Wittgenstein: the idea that in philosophy we tend to «lay down requirements» on how things must be, rather than looking at how things are; and the idea that in philosophy we should aim to look at things «in a realistic spirit» Now, if philosophy is to a considerable extent a struggle against the tendency to lay down requirements on our thought and experience, where does this tendency come from?

The tendency is certainly something that Wittgenstein saw as having been at work in his own earlier philosophizing. So this conception of how we go wrong in philosophy is certainly very important in understanding the difference between early and later Wittgenstein. Conant and C. Diamond, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely. Weiss eds. See also the Italian collection of essays: J.

Diamond, Rileggere Wittgenstein, edited by P. Donatelli, with a Foreword by P. Donatelli and an Afterword by S. Bronzo, Roma, Carocci, Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit I am not sure how one would try to connect it up with other kinds of elements in our thought. The inclination is to say that it has to do with the «scientific spirit of the age», since in science we come to see something in common between phenomena — say the law of gravitation — that is explanatory.

Thus the tendency to lay down requirements in philosophy might be connected to a desire for explanation that we see satisfied by modern science. However, I am not sure it is correct to say that the tendency I talk about derives from the attempt to model philosophy on modern science. I really feel somewhat hesitant in making grand claims of that sort. There might be a difference here between your work and the work of other philosophers who share important elements of your understanding of Wittgenstein.

They both provide general diagnoses of the source of philosophical problems. McDowell sketches a more historical answer, tracing the philosophical problems that most concern him — which have to do, broadly, with the place of the mind in the natural world — to the rise of modern science But the attempt to provide general diagnoses of this sort does not seem to be very prominent in your writings.

I think there is a certain amount of that where I talk about the way philosophers do ethics. I do have generalizations about how we tend to read literary texts as illustrations of theories, rather than looking at the variety of forms of moral thought that you can see exemplified in literary texts. I think these claims surface in the piece on The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy33, and in other places where I am talking about philosophy in relation to literature But I do not have an explanatory 31 S.

Cavell, The Claim of Reason. Cavell et al. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, chaps. Some Questions, in L. Alanen, S. Wallgren eds. It may be that there are various actual elements in us that lead us toward philosophical theorizing. One of the things I do mention in the Moral Differences and Distances piece, is that at least some theorizing in moral philosophy expresses a kind of moralistic impulse which is shared, I think, by a lot of moral philosophers — a moralizing impulse that thinkers like Nietzsche or Bernard Williams are very much reacting against.

I do think that there is an incredible desire to oversimplify in philosophy. This is not so much a part of the anthropology of human beings, but of the self-selection process of philosophers. Some people are perplexed by your work and by your reading of Wittgenstein because they think it is «quietistic». One of the things that strike me about this discussion is the animosity with which the issue tends to divide the philosophical community.

It seems that this is not a purely intellectual disagreement, but one of those disagreements that «cause hatred and anger», as Socrates said to Euthyphro. What do you think is involved in the charge of «quietism», and how would you respond to it?

There is certainly a kind of serious resentment that comes out not infrequently in responses to Wittgensteinian or Austinian conceptions of philosophical method.

This is connected also with some of the reasons why the history of analytic philosophy is something that a lot of people, in a sense, really do not want in their departments, because what it is saying are things like: «Are your questions really intelligible as questions?

Do your questions really make sense? This sort of attempt to raise issues about what might be built into your philosophical method is very uncomfortable-making. The situation here is in some respects similar to the widespread antagonism to feminist philosophy. Sally Haslanger, for example, has spelled out how a perfectly respectable thinker, say Jennifer Saul, writes two articles, a feminist one and a non-feminist one, and she sends them to the same journal, and one comes back the same day, whereas the other one gets taken seriously The same thing would happen with Wittgensteinian philosophy.

I am not really answering your question, but simply elaborating it: there is indeed a great deal of emotional investment that surfaces in discussions of quietism. I think «quietism» is an unhelpful term, because it is understood in so many different ways, and is often used just as a kind of battering ram: «Wittgensteinians simply refuse to take philosophical problems seriously; their methodology is a form of evasion».

Wittgenstein is after understanding, and this includes understanding what is at stake in what we take to be philosophical problems. So I see as very important his remark that you have to untie a philosophical knot by philosophy which is as complicated as the knot it is trying to undo There is a piece by Marilyn McCord Adams37 which illustrates part of what is at issue in discussions of quietism and Wittgensteinian philosophical method.

She maintains that it must be possible to compare our language- games with reality itself in order to see whether they should be changed or not: there must be a position of criticism external to all our language- games.

What is taken for granted in that line of thought is that the idea of serious criticisms that start from within the ways in which we deal with our concepts, and work with that, and criticize from 35 See S. Haslanger, Changing the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy. Not By Reason Alone , in «Hypatia», 23 , pp. See also C. McCarthy and S. Stidd eds. I think this comes out in various sorts of criticism that I have come across as a moral philosopher.

Some people see the way in which I want to do moral philosophy as if it involved just «stipulating» the validity of current values, as opposed to taking them as genuinely open for discussion and criticism. For example, it has been maintained that I simply stipulate that human beings, as such, are morally significant: I am read as holding a conservative view and refusing to recognize that there are serious moral questions about the moral status of animals Consider also the so-called «argument from marginal cases», which is a closely related issue.

Again, my refusal to accept that argument seems to some philosopher just a matter of being conservative in my evaluations of human beings. The «rescue vs. This issue, I think, raises the same type of questions that come up in the discussion about the moral status of animals, namely questions about what is allowed to count as morally relevant.

So it seems that critics who take your moral philosophy to be «quietistic», because you refuse to engage in a certain form of philosophical theorizing, also take it to be conservative.

I should also say that, in fact, part of that criticism goes with descriptions of what I hold that are totally untrue. For example, I am sometimes taken to maintain that the terms «just» or «unjust» cannot be applied to the ways in which we treat animals; but this is not at all what I would want say That is a serious misreading of Eating Meat and Eating People.

Your seminal essay, Throwing Away the Ladder, opened up a new way of approaching the book, which is now known as the Resolute Reading. A defining feature of this approach is that we should take seriously, indeed resolutely, the penultimate remark of the book, where Wittgenstein writes that in order to understand him, we must overcome and throw away his own propositions, recognizing them as mere nonsense.

According to traditional readings, the Tractatus aims to articulate and convey a number of philosophical doctrines — about, say, the nature of thought, language, logic, inference, mathematics, ethics, etc. Any such substantive doctrine, according to the resolute approach, is intended to be part of the ladder that we are eventually supposed to throw away. How would you sum up your alternative view about the goal of the Tractatus?

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View and download Instagram Stories photos and videos of Cora Diamond (@hostleague.rud.3). Cora Diamond (Emerita, University of Virginia): 2/27/ “The Problem of Impiety”. Funded by the Forry Fund in Philosophy and Science;. @cora_diamond Cora Diamond . 69,, , Followers, Following, Posts. Post, Activity, Likes, Comments. 1, Social Events.Affordable, luxury, sterling, vermeil and diamond jewelry from Canada

Diamond is also admired for her sustained ethical stance concerning the mis- treatment of animals -- the inhuman use, to morph Norbert Weiner's phrase, of nonhuman beings. Finkelstein, 'Holism and Animal Minds'. Notes to the individual essays are immediately attached to each as they appear, and the volume concludes with a combined name and subject index. All of the essays are valuable in their own right as worthwhile philosophical discussions of their particular topics. I nevertheless found myself disappointed by the fact that the essays taught me relatively little in-depth about Diamond's philosophy.

There are many ways of honoring a highly-regarded thinker, and certainly bringing together essays by persons who have been influenced by the individual's work is one tried and true method.

From my perspective, however, previously knowing something but not very much about Diamond's thought, I had hoped that the present volume would provide a window on her ideas, as the title seemed to promise, an introduction to be pursued thereafter, turning more assiduously to original writings after being prepared to understand Diamond's philosophy in perspective. I expected a roadmap to point out places of interest in Diamond's work, with solid sharply-focused critical interaction to make the philosopher's opus come alive, calling attention to attractions and hazards en route, to wonders and difficulties that might otherwise go unnoticed or under-appreciated.

Crary's Introduction goes some distance toward this goal, but the essays by and large do not. The authors in virtually every instance pay lip service at some point to Diamond as someone whose seminal writings on this or that exegetical or philosophical problem have had an impact on their own thinking, or with whom they have discussed related ideas in the past, and then proceed to ride their own hobbyhorses to the end of the essay on whatever subject other than Diamond Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson, Fontane, etc.

Here, as befits a review of such a diverse collection of philosophical essays, are some highly impressionistic impressions that cannot pretend to do justice to any of the individual essays. The usual reasons of space forbid my discussing all of the papers individually, by which I mean no disapproval by neglect.

I concentrate instead on those that I think bear the most criticism, rather than squandering my word allotment in paltry synopsis. Thus, I pass over with little or no comment some of my favorite papers in the collection, especially those of Floyd, Lovibond, and Mulhall.

Part I Wittgenstein. Conant, taking inspiration years ago from Diamond's groundbreaking essay, 'Throwing Away the Ladder', has led the charge of 'resolute' interpreters of Wittgenstein's early philosophy in the Tractatus. Conant's essay, which we can take with due disclaimers as representative of this section, weighs in at pages including extensive notes. Conant frames religious analogies of the Tractatus Old Testament and Philosophical Investigations and other posthumata New Testament with fabricated quotations from a fictional Johannes Climacus, pirating Kierkegaard's pseudonym, in order to talk about the positions developed in his own essay from an ironic, third-person perspective.

Within this quasi-literary format, Conant repackages 'New Wittgensteinian' ideas about the Tractatus with which he is affiliated. Interesting new twists are nevertheless woven into the mix as Conant considers a succession of lists of theses that might be attributed to Wittgenstein in the Tractatus , together with what Conant extrapolates as Wittgenstein's imagined later reactions to them.

The issue, or one of them anyway, in trying to understand the relation between the two main periods of Wittgenstein's lifework, is that if the later Wittgenstein rejects what the early Wittgenstein wrote, especially about meaning and the constellation of associated topics, as he certainly seems to do in Philosophical Investigations , Philosophical Grammar and Philosophical Remarks from The Big Typescript , then it would appear that either the early Wittgenstein was trying after all to advance meaningful theses capable of being denied anon, or else at least that the later Wittgenstein takes himself to have previously done so.

Since both possibilities argue against resolute readings of the Tractatus as Wittgenstein's effort to do away with all attempts at philosophical discourse as irredeemably meaningless, as certain critics of the New Wittgensteinians have argued, the topic has special urgency for their approach. Pros and cons of resolute or non-chickening-out readings of the Tractatus notwithstanding, I am troubled by the fact that in 6.

To my way of thinking, this does not merely suggest but fully implies that it is literally nonsensical for Wittgenstein also to have written that his propositions are literally nonsensical. It is hard for me accordingly to understand how anyone could intelligibly adopt a resolute reading of 6.

For the passage also pulls the rug out from under itself as equally unsinnig as the rest of the text. A resolute, non-chickening-out reading of 6. Must not a resolutist, then, trying to be resolute in particular about the implications of passage 6. These are mysteries that the resolutists, at least in the present venue, do not venture to resolve.

Still, the New Wittgensteinians, following Diamond, and with Conant among others manifestly at the helm, have done an invaluable service in calling attention to previously unremarked difficulties in understanding the real message of Wittgenstein's Tractatus , and of the too frequently underestimated pitfalls of reading the text without keeping 6.

Ultimately, though, I find Conant's distinctions and range of alternative approaches to the text far too limiting, despite his efforts to work out a variety of resolutist heterodoxies, including mild, severe, and zealous mono-Wittgensteinianisms like different versions of monotheism, following the religious conceit Conant playfully develops throughout the essay.

The distinction between resolute and irresolute readings of the Tractatus strikes me as especially cartoonish, a set of false alternatives. Wittgenstein's early treatise presents itself as something more like a work of medieval mysticism, describing a course of thought or way of life that the sage or saint has had to work through over time and finally surpassed or triumphed against, arriving at ineffable insights amounting to a revelation. The ladder metaphor in 6.

Bertrand Russell asked a pacing young Wittgenstein in his room whether he was thinking about logic or his sins, to which Wittgenstein characteristically answered, 'Both' Russell, Autobiography , Chapter 9. If Conant's fundamental distinction among interpretations is correct, however, then categorizing Wittgenstein's early philosophy as ineffable belongs exclusively to the irresolute, chickening-out approach to reading the thornier passages of the Tractatus.

I am amazed, finally, to discover that resolutists who want to be faithful to Wittgenstein's conclusions in Tractatus 6. It appears that in order to be resolute, to avoid chickening out in the effort to be consistently loyal to Wittgenstein's insight that 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', a philosophical commentator must be inexhaustibly prolix.

To understand Wittgenstein, one cannot practice what one preaches; the resolute interpreter of Wittgenstein cannot be a consistent committed Wittgensteinian by his or her own lights, but must enter the fray as an outsider, a non- or even anti-Wittgensteinian.

Game 4 if necessary : Monday, Oct. Game 5 if necessary : Wednesday, Oct. The ALDS is played in a format where the team with the better regular season record gets home field for Games 1, 2 and 5. Petersburg, Fla. All games can be streamed on MLB. TV, FoxSports. Viewers can also check out the series on FuboTV free trial. Baz won a silver medal at the Tokyo Olympics in August before getting called up to the majors in September.

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Rays manager Kevin Cash hates the question. To say it as Cash does seems simply a restatement of the original premise. Yes, it is about the players. What is different about the Rays, and why does no other team emulate what they do? What the Rays do that no other team does is put their culture first. Indeed, it is many times not their fault but just a by-product of earning large incomes at a young age.

His New York Mets failed to make the playoffs. The year-old Cole was the losing pitcher in the Wild Card game. It closely matches the approach of Rays manager Kevin Cash. Boston is also hesitant now to sign a big-name, big-priced free agent, preferring instead to sign players who are first committed to the team.

Their trade-deadline pickup of Kyle Schwarber reflected this, and the Red Sox have reaped rewards from it. Ultimately, the Red Sox seem the worst opponent the Rays could have in the playoffs. Apparently, however, that is no accident.

Not only are the great chefs, restaurants, charcuteries, etc. So I see nothing wrong with great restaurants or individual families serving meat recipes, as long as the animals are raised humanely. Obviously, humane treatment of animals would raise the price of meat, so it would become a special dish. Besides the suffering of animals in factory farming, there are good environmental reasoning for learning to live with vegetable protein sources as our main everyday protein sources.

Again, Diamond — and I — are responding to the sorts of arguments made by people like Singer, which have precisely the extreme implications I have described. We are not responding to moderate, measured, reasonable individual positions like yours. It would be more correct to say that pets, friends, fellow citizens of a thriving republic in peacetime, socially parasitic animals such as rats, sacred animals, zoo animals in times other than famines, are not to be eaten or killed, whereas large wild game, rats when one is desperate, industrially slaughtered cattle, and, yes, human enemies in wartime, may be both killed and eaten.

There may be morally relevant distinctions between humans and animals, but we are not going to discover them by looking at the actual range of what people conceptualize, under various circumstances, as edible or inedible. Although this journey to the far East, I suppose, might support some notion of conceptualized dispensation by consulting a GPS device of your choice. Excellent discussion Daniel — I do agree entirely.

This is indeed where my own theory lies, and yes, my ideas can be quite immoral. No, not objectively so. Perhaps this can provide a type of meat which happens to be far more tasty than any other variety. I want to thank you for posting on this topic and for being willing to debate it with a layperson like myself.

Not all professional philosophers, even those with blogs, are open to debating topics with non-philosophers: they often pull rank or cite articles or books which are not accessible to the general public.

Korea is not a modern, Westernized country? Are you suggesting that the problem some may have with Diamond is that her view is not normative enough? That is, it describes rather than prescribes? I only just finished reading the paper. Nothing I can disagree with there,if I have understood it. It seems to me that Cora Diamond is more or less taking Singer to school. But I guess that Singer is saying what many people want to hear, they long for system, consistency and universality in morality.

It is interesting listening to Singer and Dawkins speak. Dawkins appears to idolise Singer, but since Dawkins is not a vegetarian, he speaks to Singer as does a penitent to a priest in the confessional. It was made in jest. Dan K mentioned going to Korea where he might dine on dog. She demonstrates that the givens he builds from are only good if you already have a certain squeamishness towards eating meat which leads to a kind of question begging.

So I take it that Wittgenstenians would have no problem with slavery had they lived prior to the 19th century? Seems I should have led with the last point. She provided the necessary evidence to challenge Singer-like positions …. So yes I assume she knew about cannibals and likely all the rest of the issues raised here.

The essay was sufficient for its purpose. With all this in mind, I still think it was useful for people to bring up the fact that her account of ethical decisions with respect to animals in general and food in specific was not complete. I agree with you re: Singer but would go even further….

Of course I agree with you here too, even if it does raise interesting questions for the plight of minority populations. I think he is transparently fair in his acknowledgement of and description of the superiority of her arguments, as opposed to, say, those arguments made by Singer or Regan.

You have a problem with Smith? Then take it up with him. I found his piece interesting and thought other readers might as well.

It seems obviously wrong to me, to the point of not needing commentary. I remember my father getting frustrated at my disinterest in steak, aged 4, and coming over to place one hand on top of my head and the other beneath my jaw to forcibly mimic the motion of chewing that I should engage in for my own well-being. Hated steak then, but thought meatballs were heavenly. Whenever people have a moralistic stance towards this topic, it feels wrong-headed wrong-hearted?

I think also of abortion in connection with this. Here too, it is mostly the moralizing, on both sides, which are offensive. It is ironic that in many most? People need to respect the space that deeply personal ethical questions require for inner consideration. Some people will just not wish to devote moral deliberations to every issue.

Or, talk to them in 15 years and maybe something will have changed. Examples matter more than intellectual justifications. There can be contexts in which people do Y because of A alone, another context where B alone. This might be an issue of language. So the characteristics like pleasure and pain can lead to non-exploitation, but other concerns can also lead there.

This is true descriptively, not just as a logical possibility, as seen in multiple examples. Good talking to you. Some philosophers think that the aim of moral theory is to systematize our common moral intuitions. As scientific theories must match the observed data, they say, so must ethical theories match the data of our settled moral convictions.

I have elsewhere argued against the inbuilt conservatism of this approach…[as] liable to take relics of our cultural history as the touchstone of morality…Our moral convictions are not reliable data for testing ethical theories.

We should work from sound theories to practical judgments, not from our judgments to our theories. Now, some may criticize this as bloodless and unemotional, but it sounds like a very defensible stance for a professional philosopher to hold.

He would agree completely with Diamond that ordinary ways of thinking are inconsistent, or hypocritical and confused. Whether we ought to be vegetarians depends on a lot of facts about the situation in which we find ourselves. Some writers find this strange. They think of vegetarians as moral absolutists, who will stick to their belief in the immorality of eating meat no matter what. His uncertainties about being a vegetarian are far more pragmatic — whether you can make a difference:.

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She personally designs and hand crafts each piece of jewelry, taking pride in seeing her work on the golf course as much as at the gala. Skip to content Main Navigation. Looking for something? Generic selectors. Exact matches only.

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This collection offers an in-depth look at Cora Diamond's distinctive approach to ethics and its philosophical significance. Murdoch and Cora Diamond in moral philosophy and Margaret Urban Walker, Hilde Lindeman, and Marian Verkerk's joint take on bioethics. Cora Diamond is a leading American philosopher who is well known for her contributions to the interpretation of Wittgenstein and Frege.

I was treating both of those as secondary senses, in one case of «deception» and in the other case of «duty». That is where my ideas on secondary sense first got formulated.

None of us knew terribly much about Wittgenstein, and besides the three of us, it 9 G. Diamond, Secondary Sense , reprinted in Ead. Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind, Cambridge, Mass. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit might have been one or two students. So it was a very nice opportunity to work through the material. The other essay of mine that comes from the Sixties is the piece on Dummett and the philosophy of mathematics I sent it off to «Mind», but Ryle did not want it: he said they did not want to publish an historical piece.

I sent it to «Philosophical Review», I guess, and got turned down. So I never did anything with that paper for many years. But I did send it to Rhees at some point around that time. Before he gave a talk to his students, Wittgenstein would, in the week before, write down ideas. Rhees had also copies of the notes that Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald had taken at those classes. We did quite a lot of work on that project. Then we had the idea of getting Alice Ambrose involved. At some point when we were working on the material, Rhees gave me material from and asked me whether I thought there was anything to be done with it.

These were student notes from lectures on the philosophy of mathematics. There were four different sets of notes.

It was not clear what one could do with them. I had no idea what to do with the notes that Rhees handed over to me. The same remarks would come up in different orders and phrased in different ways. It was very hard to see that you could make any sort of single account out of it. That material was actually similar to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology that Peter Geach published Geach decided to publish each version of the notes he had; but if you look at 11 C.

Diamond, The Face of Necessity, in Ead. Ambrose ed. Geach ed. I first started playing around with the material. You have four people, taking notes, coming up with things that are very different. One of them, R. So I had the actual shorthand notes he took, plus his own edited version. So I had all this different material and it took me really quite a long time to begin to figure out how I could put it together. Eventually, I got a technique of working.

I would take a passage of perhaps ten minutes and I would set out each of the four versions on parallel columns, using colors to mark the correspondences between the different versions.

So, for example, I had on one column a passage in red followed by a passage in yellow; on another column, I had the yellow passage first; on yet another column, possibly, I had only the red passage. I gradually came to have some kind of sense of what Wittgenstein might have said that yielded these four different versions. That was certainly important to the way I came to know Wittgenstein. I believe I had a complete draft of this material by the summer of Rhees was involved in trying to find a publisher.

He was reluctant to try Blackwell, because he thought Elizabeth Anscombe would be against it, and Blackwell would decide whatever Elizabeth would decide. There is a sense in which this went on behind her back. But the copyrights of the material I edited had nothing to do with the executors. The copyright of the lecture notes is in the lecture notes takers.

So we went to Cornell as the original publisher. Cornell, eventually — and rather stupidly, I think — let it go out of print. At that point, they sent me the copyrights and I asked Chicago whether they were interested. Diamond ed. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit dismissed as rather amateurish. I am not deep in contemporary issues in philosophy of mathematics, the way somebody like Juliet Floyd or Hilary Putnam is.

One of the aspects of the lectures on the foundations of mathematics that was very important for me is the discussion of proof: the significance of the fact that there may be many proofs of the same proposition, what happens when a proposition first gets proved, whether this is an answer to a pre-existing question, and so on.

All this fed directly into my paper on riddles15, which I wrote in What led you to move back to the US? This happened gradually. Michael and I came to Charlottesville to spend a year, with me as visitor at the University of Virginia. We came in , which was in the middle of the Vietnam War. It was a very tense time in many ways. Every male student had some kind of question about how he was going to deal with the draft.

I had one student, for example, who went off to some place where there was somebody who could set things up so that when you saw a blood-pressure device, your blood- pressure would go up; in this way, when you were examined for the draft, you would come out as having very high blood pressure, and you would get exempt. This was one of the possibilities; other people were hoping to be conscientious objectors, and so on. But one definitely had the idea that the draft was an issue for every male student.

All the undergraduates at the University of Virginia were male at that time the University started to admit female students only in , under legal pressure , and the graduate students were to a large extent men.

Also, in the spring of that year, there was a student strike here in Virginia, in response to the Kent State shootings During the strike, my students met in the house that 15 C. Some unarmed students were protesting against the Cambodian Campaign, which Nixon had just announced. The Ohio National Guard fired on the students, killing four students and wounding nine others. The episode was followed by a strike of four million students across the United States.

It was a very fraught sort of time, and very interesting in its way. Also, my family was directly involved. During the spring, my sister and brother-in-law were here in Charlottesville as visitors. It turned out that my brother-in-law had been thinking about organizing a hiding place for Daniel Berrigan17 out in the country here.

My brother-in-law, Eqbal Ahmad, was at that time very much involved in the Catholic anti-war movement, including the Berrigan brothers, Dan and Philip Berrigan. At that time, Dan did things like suddenly appear and give a sermon in a church, in a totally unannounced way, and then disappear; Eqbal was helping to organize all of this. My parents were away, but my sister and bother-in-law were there, as well as a whole bunch of other people who had to do with the anti-war movement.

We were talking about the situation of Philip Berrigan, who was then in prison; in particular, we were discussing whether it should be said that he was depressed, or whether that would be insulting to the suffering that he was going through. Just to give you a sense of the situation, all these people could not make any telephone call, because their phones would be tapped, so they would go out to use public telephones.

And my family, especially my brother-in-law, was particularly involved in those issues. In the summer of , Michael and I went back to Scotland, and during that year my brother-in-law was charged with conspiracy to kidnap Henry Kissinger. My brother-in-law came up with the following idea.

Using their acquaintances in Washington, maybe they could get invited to a dinner party attended by Kissinger, and at the end of dinner, they would announce something like this: «Mr. So this was talked about. One of the people at the meeting was a nun, Elizabeth McAlister, who was in love with the priest Philip Berrigan. They later got married, and had some young anti-war activists! She gave this note to a man called Boyd Douglas, asking him to bring it to Philip.

She did not know that Douglas was a spy for the FBI. He was a prisoner in the same prison as Philip. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit lying kind of offence.

He was allowed out of prison to take classes at Bucknell University. But that was the cover: actually, he was let out of prison to spy on the anti-war movement at Bucknell University.

He was a real creep. Just to give you an idea, stories came out later that there were various women who were approached by him saying that he was dying of cancer and that the last thing he wanted to do was to sleep with them! This is the sort of guy he was. Anyway, Douglas made a copy of the note that Elizabeth gave him and handed it over to the FBI before he gave it to Philip. In fact, nothing came out of that idea. But the letter was the basis for an indictment of seven or eight people, plus five or six un-indicted co-conspirators.

What eventually happened was that the case went to trial in The prosecution made its case and the defense decided to make the claim that the prosecution had not created a case that was even good enough to try to answer. On that basis, the case went to the jury and the jury then voted 10 to 2 for acquittal.

At that point, the government had the option of starting a new trial. But they had already spent about a million dollars to get, without any defense being offered, a 10 to 2 vote for acquittal. In terms of whether it was worth going forward and trying again, they ultimately decided not to. So they dropped the case.

But it was very frightening at the time because there was a huge government machinery that, as far as we knew, could have put Eqbal as well as all the other people involved in prison for years. While Michael and I were in Scotland and all this was happening to my family, we received a phone call from Anthony Woozley, who was the chair of the department here at the University of Virginia, saying that it was possible for them to offer me a permanent position.

They needed to know very quickly; in fact, we had essentially one day to decide. I think that our decision to move back was very much shaped by the fact that my brother-in-law was under indictment and that this was a very strange time for the United States. Though I had been living in the UK for many years, I was very moved, during the time we were in Virginia the year before, by the way people were deeply involved and concerned about the war.

So I accepted what was then a tenured associate professorship at the University of Virginia, starting in the fall of Obviously, that decision made a huge difference for my professional life, and eventually for my marriage with Michael. Michael and I separated in the fall of , actually before I got together with Tony Woozley. I was in Charlottesville alone in , and then I spent a sabbatical year in the UK, first in Shetland and then in London.

It was during that year that Tony and I started writing to each other and eventually got together. I wrote the riddles paper, which I think was an important step in the development of my thought, during the summer of I wrote the paper in Shetland, in a little cottage in the middle of nowhere. I remember that I had only one copy of it. But in the meanwhile, I was very nervous about the situation and I kept the only copy of my paper in the loo, which was not part of the main building, thinking that if the house would burn down, I could still save the paper from the fire!

In those years, I also started to work on Frege, in relation to the question of nonsense. Frege and Nonsense18 was written around and came out in , in the volume in honor of Elizabeth Anscombe that Jenny Teichman and I edited19; the paper What Nonsense Might Be20, which is closely related, was also written in those years.

Here I would like to mention another thing that was very important for me as the background of my thinking about Wittgenstein. In the late Seventies, I was also working on ethics. The paper Eating Meat and Eating People23 comes roughly from that period. I think I gave a version of that paper in Warwick, during my sabbatical in Diamond, Frege and Nonsense , reprinted in Ead. Diamond and J. Teichman eds. Essays in Honour of G. Anscombe, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, Diamond, Throwing Away the Ladder.

How to Read the Tractatus , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, The Reality of the Past , reprinted in Ead. Anscombe, pp. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit How did you become interested in vegetarianism and animal ethics? Ah, animals! We meet in the winter of , and we gradually become interested in going out in the countryside around Oxford, looking at the flowers, looking at the birds, and so on.

I finished my B. Michael and I and five or six other people rented a derelict chateau in southwest France. We found out only later that in fact it had been used as an internment camp for Jewish refugees from Austria and Germany who were ultimately sent off to Auschwitz. So we were there, wandering around that wonderful countryside, having wonderful meals, and in that derelict chateau, the doves were flying back and forth through the broken windows.

It was very lovely. The last night, just before we left, we had dinner at a local restaurant, and the patron served us pigeons. We had been seeing and enjoying the pigeons, and now here are the pigeons; it was sort of… funny. That was one episode. Next stage in our life, we go to Swansea and we rent a little flat in a very old house, about ten miles out in the countryside.

We lived on a slope of a large hill, where sheep were wandering about. As we were wandering about, the sheep were always there. Meat was extremely cheap at that time. We were having bacon for breakfast, and maybe kidneys for lunch, or brains on toast, and then mutton for dinner! It was a very meaty kind of life that we were living. That was a decision. Somehow, the kinds of tensions that had been present in our lives issued in that decision.

He just felt: «No, enough of this». At this point, in , there are basically no vegetarians, there are no vegetarian restaurants, there are no vegetarian cookbooks, there is basically nothing. It was not the way it is now. We did not know what we were going to do. How do you eat when your typical dish was potatoes, veggies, and meat, and now you take away meat, so that you have potatoes, veggies, space?

We did go on eating fish for a while, which I think made a lot of sense given the way things were. But anyway we managed, and gradually got into cooking things without meat. I think the ways I have come to think about animals were originally shaped by conversations with Michael at that time. I think one of the ideas that you get in Eating Meat and Eating People is that we have various concepts that come from our moral life with other people, and these concepts are given an application to animals.

That way of looking at things comes out of those discussions with Michael. In the early Seventies, there were books on vegetarianism coming out, but of a very different sort. So one source of my thinking about animals was the fact that Michael and I became vegetarians for reasons that had nothing to do with the philosophical situation, but with our personal situation: we became vegetarians, and then began thinking about it.

But also, what got into the mix was the presence of a way of thinking about vegetarianism that was very different. It was out of that mix that came Eating Meat and Eating People. The essay Experimenting on Animals26 is also from that period. As I said, Michael and I became vegetarians in the early Sixties.

A good friend of ours for many years, David Sperlinger, would come out to visit us and we often talked about vegetarianism. Eventually, he became a clinical psychologist and in the Seventies he invited me to a meeting of the British Psychological Association, where I read the Experimenting on Animals paper, at roughly the same time as I read the Eating Meat and Eating People paper in Warwick. Was the discussion of animals and vegetarianism your first work in moral philosophy?

Yes, except for the bit of material on ethics contained in the essay on secondary sense. I should also say that part of the reason I came to work on ethics had to do with my teaching. When I was at Swansea and Sussex, I was teaching stuff all over the map, including ethics.

Aberdeen, like all the other ancient Scottish universities, had at that time a Moral Philosophy Department separate from what you might think of as a metaphysics and epistemology department, which they called the «Logic Department». So, for example, when Tony was at St. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch and J. Harris eds. Diamond, Experimenting on Animals.

A Problem in Ethics , reprinted in Ead. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit the knowledge of the Professor of Logic; it was through his doing that the Logic Department and the Moral Philosophy Department came to have a building that they shared and a single library. When I was in Aberdeen, we did have a single library, and I taught several classes in the Logic Department; but the organization of especially the first two years of the undergraduate teaching was totally separate in Moral Philosophy and Logic.

I taught Rousseau for years, I taught Hume, and I used to teach an advanced class on contemporary problems in ethics. This is, I think, an important part of the background of my work in moral philosophy. Would you like to mention any other biographical event that had a significant impact on your philosophical development? The whole development of my collaboration with Jim Conant has obviously been very important over a good number of years.

I met Jim when he was a graduate student at Harvard, when I went there to give a talk. This would have been the mid Eighties. I presented a version of my paper Losing Your Concepts27, before it was actually published. I think Jim wrote me a letter after that. So we started to exchange letters, on actual pieces of paper — technologically, this was before you do nothing but emails. Gradually, as the conversation developed, we did move into a combination of emails and phone calls; but the emails were quite useful because you could keep records of the exchanges.

I had never specifically tried to deal with the Tractatus on ethics. The conversations I had with Jim motivated me to broach this topic, but at the same time showed me how difficult it was actually to say anything about what was… unsayable!

Those conversations with Jim toward the end of his Harvard career were very important and developed into a long-term collaboration over the years when he was a fellow at Michigan and then a professor at 27 C. Diamond, Losing Your Concepts, in «Ethics», 98 , pp. Crary and R. Read eds. We are obviously still in touch with each other, and have a lot of plans to do things together, and sometime maybe we will.

We have got one paper that we wrote together, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely29, but we would hope to do more. Rhees came to the class. He objected to a lot of what I was saying and put a lot of pressure on me. I was quite specifically interested in the ways in which you could give a sense to a proposition which did not have a sense. Rhees, on the other hand, was trying to push me into looking at a quite different angle: questions about what different ways of saying the same thing had to have in common in order to be able to express that content, rather than questions concerning the ways in which you could use a single sign-combination to say different things.

I propose to conclude here the more biographical part of the interview and move on to some questions more directly concerned with your philosophy. In your first collection of essays, The Realistic Spirit, you introduce two notions that are central to your appropriation of Wittgenstein: the idea that in philosophy we tend to «lay down requirements» on how things must be, rather than looking at how things are; and the idea that in philosophy we should aim to look at things «in a realistic spirit» Now, if philosophy is to a considerable extent a struggle against the tendency to lay down requirements on our thought and experience, where does this tendency come from?

The tendency is certainly something that Wittgenstein saw as having been at work in his own earlier philosophizing. So this conception of how we go wrong in philosophy is certainly very important in understanding the difference between early and later Wittgenstein. Conant and C. Diamond, On Reading the Tractatus Resolutely. Weiss eds. See also the Italian collection of essays: J. Diamond, Rileggere Wittgenstein, edited by P.

Donatelli, with a Foreword by P. Donatelli and an Afterword by S. Bronzo, Roma, Carocci, Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit I am not sure how one would try to connect it up with other kinds of elements in our thought.

The inclination is to say that it has to do with the «scientific spirit of the age», since in science we come to see something in common between phenomena — say the law of gravitation — that is explanatory.

Thus the tendency to lay down requirements in philosophy might be connected to a desire for explanation that we see satisfied by modern science. However, I am not sure it is correct to say that the tendency I talk about derives from the attempt to model philosophy on modern science. I really feel somewhat hesitant in making grand claims of that sort. There might be a difference here between your work and the work of other philosophers who share important elements of your understanding of Wittgenstein.

They both provide general diagnoses of the source of philosophical problems. McDowell sketches a more historical answer, tracing the philosophical problems that most concern him — which have to do, broadly, with the place of the mind in the natural world — to the rise of modern science But the attempt to provide general diagnoses of this sort does not seem to be very prominent in your writings. I think there is a certain amount of that where I talk about the way philosophers do ethics.

I do have generalizations about how we tend to read literary texts as illustrations of theories, rather than looking at the variety of forms of moral thought that you can see exemplified in literary texts. I think these claims surface in the piece on The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy33, and in other places where I am talking about philosophy in relation to literature But I do not have an explanatory 31 S.

Cavell, The Claim of Reason. Cavell et al. Diamond, The Realistic Spirit, chaps. Some Questions, in L. Alanen, S. Wallgren eds. It may be that there are various actual elements in us that lead us toward philosophical theorizing.

One of the things I do mention in the Moral Differences and Distances piece, is that at least some theorizing in moral philosophy expresses a kind of moralistic impulse which is shared, I think, by a lot of moral philosophers — a moralizing impulse that thinkers like Nietzsche or Bernard Williams are very much reacting against. I do think that there is an incredible desire to oversimplify in philosophy. This is not so much a part of the anthropology of human beings, but of the self-selection process of philosophers.

Some people are perplexed by your work and by your reading of Wittgenstein because they think it is «quietistic». One of the things that strike me about this discussion is the animosity with which the issue tends to divide the philosophical community. It seems that this is not a purely intellectual disagreement, but one of those disagreements that «cause hatred and anger», as Socrates said to Euthyphro.

What do you think is involved in the charge of «quietism», and how would you respond to it? There is certainly a kind of serious resentment that comes out not infrequently in responses to Wittgensteinian or Austinian conceptions of philosophical method. This is connected also with some of the reasons why the history of analytic philosophy is something that a lot of people, in a sense, really do not want in their departments, because what it is saying are things like: «Are your questions really intelligible as questions?

Do your questions really make sense? This sort of attempt to raise issues about what might be built into your philosophical method is very uncomfortable-making. The situation here is in some respects similar to the widespread antagonism to feminist philosophy.

Sally Haslanger, for example, has spelled out how a perfectly respectable thinker, say Jennifer Saul, writes two articles, a feminist one and a non-feminist one, and she sends them to the same journal, and one comes back the same day, whereas the other one gets taken seriously The same thing would happen with Wittgensteinian philosophy.

I am not really answering your question, but simply elaborating it: there is indeed a great deal of emotional investment that surfaces in discussions of quietism. I think «quietism» is an unhelpful term, because it is understood in so many different ways, and is often used just as a kind of battering ram: «Wittgensteinians simply refuse to take philosophical problems seriously; their methodology is a form of evasion».

Wittgenstein is after understanding, and this includes understanding what is at stake in what we take to be philosophical problems.

So I see as very important his remark that you have to untie a philosophical knot by philosophy which is as complicated as the knot it is trying to undo There is a piece by Marilyn McCord Adams37 which illustrates part of what is at issue in discussions of quietism and Wittgensteinian philosophical method.

She maintains that it must be possible to compare our language- games with reality itself in order to see whether they should be changed or not: there must be a position of criticism external to all our language- games. What is taken for granted in that line of thought is that the idea of serious criticisms that start from within the ways in which we deal with our concepts, and work with that, and criticize from 35 See S.

Haslanger, Changing the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy. Not By Reason Alone , in «Hypatia», 23 , pp. See also C. McCarthy and S. Stidd eds. I think this comes out in various sorts of criticism that I have come across as a moral philosopher. Some people see the way in which I want to do moral philosophy as if it involved just «stipulating» the validity of current values, as opposed to taking them as genuinely open for discussion and criticism.

For example, it has been maintained that I simply stipulate that human beings, as such, are morally significant: I am read as holding a conservative view and refusing to recognize that there are serious moral questions about the moral status of animals Consider also the so-called «argument from marginal cases», which is a closely related issue. Again, my refusal to accept that argument seems to some philosopher just a matter of being conservative in my evaluations of human beings.

The «rescue vs. This issue, I think, raises the same type of questions that come up in the discussion about the moral status of animals, namely questions about what is allowed to count as morally relevant. So it seems that critics who take your moral philosophy to be «quietistic», because you refuse to engage in a certain form of philosophical theorizing, also take it to be conservative.

I should also say that, in fact, part of that criticism goes with descriptions of what I hold that are totally untrue. For example, I am sometimes taken to maintain that the terms «just» or «unjust» cannot be applied to the ways in which we treat animals; but this is not at all what I would want say That is a serious misreading of Eating Meat and Eating People.

Your seminal essay, Throwing Away the Ladder, opened up a new way of approaching the book, which is now known as the Resolute Reading. A defining feature of this approach is that we should take seriously, indeed resolutely, the penultimate remark of the book, where Wittgenstein writes that in order to understand him, we must overcome and throw away his own propositions, recognizing them as mere nonsense.

According to traditional readings, the Tractatus aims to articulate and convey a number of philosophical doctrines — about, say, the nature of thought, language, logic, inference, mathematics, ethics, etc. Any such substantive doctrine, according to the resolute approach, is intended to be part of the ladder that we are eventually supposed to throw away. How would you sum up your alternative view about the goal of the Tractatus? If it is not trying to convey a philosophical doctrine, then what does it seek to achieve?

I think there is a false alternative here between reading the book as giving us a body of doctrines, on the one hand, and claiming that the only point of the book is to get the reader to throw away the book, on the other. This latter view is often ascribed to Jim Conant and me, but it is a very weird reading of either of us There is certainly a question about what do we see the book as accomplishing.

I have tried to put this in different ways. One way I have tried to put it is that we need to take very seriously the remark about philosophy as an activity of clarification41 and that the book is intended to help us to see how to engage in that activity.

It is an activity that does not itself involve doctrinal views It does involve, however, a kind of logical-seeing-what-is-in-common. I take it that the Fregean understanding of a concept is not intended as an account of what we ordinarily mean when we use the word «concept»; in fact, it is perfectly right to say, as Benno Kerry did, that the concept 40 See e.

Amereller and E. Fischer eds. However, as Frege at some point said, everyone is free to use words the way one wants, and he wants to get us to use the word «concept» for something he wants us to see logically There is a kind of logical insight that we can have if we work with him and see what he is after.

We then see something in common, and we may label it with the word «concept», but the word itself is then not as important as getting us to the point of seeing a logical-in-common-ness. The activity that Frege is practicing, of enabling his reader to see something logically in common, gives you something very close to what Wittgenstein is doing in the Tractatus.

Interestingly, a version of the idea of seeing something logically in common comes up in the Investigations, when Wittgenstein invites us to think of the Indian mathematicians who say: «Look at this!

Of course, metaphorical notions of sight have played an enormous role in philosophy since Plato. But I think that Wittgenstein is working with a more specific idea that is present in Frege: the kind of putting before you a notion say the notion of a concept that does not correspond exactly to anything you already have, but that elucidates part of what is already at work in your judgment-making and inferential thinking.

Philosophical clarification according to the Tractatus is a matter of seeing logical-having-in-common, and this is likely to be confused with having-in-common: having-in-common is sharing a property, and sharing a property is something you can say. A logical-seeing-in-common is also a matter of logical-seeing- differences. I take it, for example, that the distinction between «function» 43 G.

Frege, On Concept and Object , in M. Beaney ed. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit and «operation» plays a major role in the Tractatus This is a matter of two different modes of using words. This difference is one of the things that the Tractatus is trying to make clear. In the Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes that differences are important.

Obviously he is critical of his earlier work in many ways, but seeing similarities and differences is really very deep in what he is doing as a philosopher in both his early and later work. Making clear similarities and differences may make possible a re-thinking of our philosophical problems themselves, so there is a connection here with the issues we were talking about in relation to quietism. What motivates the resentment that we were discussing is the critique of questions.

A lot of what Wittgenstein is doing as a philosopher is getting you to see that your question is phrased in a way that suggests that what you really want is such-and-such, while you may perhaps be led to recognize that there is confusion in your own understanding of what you wanted.

In this sense, what Wittgenstein is trying to do is to get you to rethink what you are after in your philosophical activity. But if you are a philosopher, you might very well not want somebody who comes along and says: «You need to rethink what you are doing here, since what you really want might be different from you think you want».

Some resolute readers have tried to answer the question about the point of the Tractatus along the following lines: «The point of the book is to achieve a certain transformation of the reader, rather than to put forth a body of doctrines».

Would you agree? One of the things that are transformed is what the reader thinks of philosophy itself as doing. We need to account for the prominence in the Tractatus of the idea of philosophy as clarification. It may be that the clarity which the reader achieves is a transformation of her.

But we need to explain what the activity of clarification is like, how it works, and why metaphors of seeing are so important in this connection. I hope this indicates something about why we can take perfectly seriously proposition 6. But part 46 See L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 5. When you throw them away, what you throw away is the idea that you have got some kind of necessary truth, or something of that sort. I believe that you can hold on to the idea that there is something you can do with the propositions of the Tractatus, say the 3.

What they give you is a body of ways of attempting to straighten out things in philosophy, and a kind of sensitivity about where there is a need for philosophical clarification. After all, one of the things the 3. So it is fine to say that the aim of the Tractatus is to achieve a transformation of the reader; but that leaves out the details of what is supposed to go on in this transformation, and in what ways it is connected with the apparent doctrines of the book.

Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter Geach report a conversation that Wittgenstein had with Frege the last time he saw him. I think that 6. I have used a couple of examples in my own writings to illustrate this point One example is the use of the word «proposition» when the Tractatus says: «Propositions are truth- functions of elementary propositions» What is the first word of that sentence doing? Are you saying that truth-functions of elementary propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions?

If not, what do you mean? There 47 Diamond discusses the role of the 3. Anscombe and P. Geach, Three Philosophers, Oxford, Blackwell, , pp. Diamond, Criss-Cross Philosophy, pp. Anscombe, in M. Philosophy in a Realistic Spirit is no way of making clear what the first word of that sentence means, without going the whole hog and saying that what it means is «truth- function of elementary propositions», in which case the whole sentence does not carry its force at all.

On the other hand, if it means anything that we ordinarily mean by «proposition», it is false — in the same way in which what Frege says about «concepts» is false, if we take him to speak about what we ordinarily mean by that word. So there is a sense in which the remark works in the book, but is profoundly misleading. The imagination that the sentence is telling you something involves trying to see the word «proposition» at the beginning of the sentence both as something that you grasp, and yet as not meaning any of the things you might actually mean by it.

It is a blur. An essential blur. And once you have obtained an awareness of such blur, you can still have the book working with you to get you into the activity of clarification. The other word that I have used as an example that functions in a very similar manner is the word «occur». When the Tractatus says, in 5. But what does «logically occur» mean? There is no account of logical occurrence apart from the one which is just being given in the Tractatus.

The subject matter of the proposition is given by the clarification provided by the Tractatus. So if you are aware of the role of this blur at the heart of the propositions of the book, you are going to see 6.

Frege is introducing a logical conception of what a concept is, and such a conception cannot be a genuine predicate, in the same way in which an internal relation cannot be a relation. This is what 6. In this connection, you have written that our practices, or our language-games, are «exploratory» Could you expand on this remark? Your comment touches on several interconnected issues. Yes indeed, I do want to emphasize the creativity, the openness, of language.

But I want to pick up on the issue of how we use the notion of a language-game in philosophy. For Wittgenstein, the notion of a language-game is itself something that is helpful in certain philosophical contexts, and not in others.

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If Conant's fundamental distinction among interpretations is correct, however, then categorizing Wittgenstein's early philosophy as ineffable belongs exclusively to the irresolute, chickening-out approach to reading the thornier passages of the Tractatus. I am amazed, finally, to discover that resolutists who want to be faithful to Wittgenstein's conclusions in Tractatus 6. It appears that in order to be resolute, to avoid chickening out in the effort to be consistently loyal to Wittgenstein's insight that 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent', a philosophical commentator must be inexhaustibly prolix.

To understand Wittgenstein, one cannot practice what one preaches; the resolute interpreter of Wittgenstein cannot be a consistent committed Wittgensteinian by his or her own lights, but must enter the fray as an outsider, a non- or even anti-Wittgensteinian. If we are convinced that Wittgenstein advocates silence instead of meaningless prattle about philosophical problems, should we not be silent about the need to be silent? Is that not what Wittgenstein did when he abandoned philosophy for primary school teaching in the Alps?

Should we not in all consistency then at least acknowledge that loyal Wittgensteinians trying to think and talk resolutely about Wittgenstein's counseling philosophers to be silent are equally engaging in pseudo-propositional nonsense?

For a parting topic of criticism in the first part of Crary's edition, I turn to Putnam's paper, in which he argues that the reason why Wittgenstein offers puzzling pronouncements about Cantor's diagonalization argument for the existence of transfinite cardinalities which Wittgenstein in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics disparages as a ' prahlerischen Beweis ' , and the ontic status of real numbers, is that Wittgenstein simply did not know enough about mathematics and its applications in physics to understand the indispensability of real numbers in the sciences.

I hope I am not alone in finding Putnam's abductive explanation of Wittgenstein's antagonism to transfinitary mathematics not only uncharitable and inadequately motivated, but historically implausible, given Wittgenstein's education and demonstrated practical familiarity with cutting-edge developments in logic, mathematics, and engineering.

Putnam, furthermore, overlooks Wittgenstein's reliance on real-numbered continua as entering into the logical analysis of propositions in his solution to the color incompatibility problem in the subsequently disowned essay, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form'.

Could it be instead that Wittgenstein takes a radical conceptually austere approach to the foundations of mathematics and consequently to all its conventional superstructure? There is precedent aplenty for such an attitude in the strict finitist philosophies of mathematics of George Berkeley, David Hume, and L. Brouwer, among others, all of whom are prepared to topple higher mathematics and its applications as philosophically ill-founded if their conceptual reservations cannot be satisfactorily resolved.

Finkelstein's essay, the last in this first main part, though primarily a criticism of Donald Davidson's thesis that propositional linguistic competence is a requirement for the possibility of having beliefs that appears unavailable outside our own species, bridges especially the later Wittgenstein's remarks about the intentionality of thought and requirements of philosophical grammar of discourse about belief, doubt, and other psychological states, with Diamond's moral concerns about conduct toward nonhuman animals.

Originally written for another occasion, as the final endnote n. Nussbaum writes, after a five page foray into a blow-by-blow narration of a novel she curiously enough characterizes as a work in which nothing happens, at the conclusion of her section I:. Thinking about Der Stechlin seems to me a good way to honor Cora Diamond.

So often, like Fontane, she asked us all to question assumptions about structure, "plot," and sequence that hobble philosophy as surely as they hobble the novel, asking ourselves what revolutions in style and structure, as well as content, a due attention to life's complexities might require of us. Perhaps, too, Fontane's praise of conversation is an appropriate way of indicating how deeply I value our years of conversation about these and other topics.

A tenuous connection, to say the least. Thereafter, Diamond's name does not appear even once again in the essay. If a classical analogy for this sort of paste-in tribute is appropriate, I am reminded of nothing so much as the statues of a later decadent antiquity, frugally made in two parts -- a full-length body in flowing tunic with an open socket at the neck to be completed by cementing-in any choice of interchangeable sculpted heads.

One easily imagines hauling out the same philosophical paper and tacking on a different homage for an entirely different Festschrift, acknowledging the work of any almost any other philosopher, or, potentially, in this case, comparative literary critic. We see this even in the collection's concluding essay by Crary, whose Introduction to the volume provides a much-appreciated overview of Diamond's philosophy in thirteen pages before proceeding to gloss the edited essays.

Crary in her own contribution to Part II writes: 'In describing this view, I am influenced by the work of Cora Diamond -- in even more ways than are explicitly acknowledged in the pages that follow' Explicit references to Diamond in the body of the essay are indeed conspicuous by their absence, although Crary, much to her credit, does at least bring in an interesting argument of Diamond's concerning the treatment of living animals versus dead human bodies, in connection with the view that there may be something intrinsically morally valuable about the fact of being human.

Even Crary, however, outside of her Introduction, does not focus or concentrate in detail on any of Diamond's work, examining the arguments and outlook thoroughly, to help shed light on Diamond's views about the ethics of our conduct toward nonhuman animals. What I would have liked to have seen in the book is at least a handful of essays that discuss and criticize Diamond's philosophy at length, perhaps a single one of her significant papers, tracing connections to the development of her thought over the years and separating the gold from the dross.

Cavell in my opinion does about the best job of integrating discussion of Diamond's own work with interests of his own, while staying on track for much of his paper on Diamond. McDowell's contribution is exceptional also in that he responds to Cavell's preceding essay with almost exclusive concern for its connection to Diamond's work. I may have learned more about Diamond's philosophical outlook from Crary's Introduction and McDowell's response to Cavell than from all the other papers combined.

McDowell's paper remains an oddity nonetheless. Crary's editorial apparatus does not explain how McDowell came to read Cavell's paper, or how it is that his paper answers Cavell as another contributor to the book, nor does McDowell offer a clue to this anomaly that none of the other essays in the book features. Nussbaum writes, after a five page foray into a blow-by-blow narration of a novel she curiously enough characterizes as a work in which nothing happens, at the conclusion of her section I: Thinking about Der Stechlin seems to me a good way to honor Cora Diamond.

I was puzzled when I first paged through the essays and examined the table of contents, to observe that, contrary to custom, there was no reply to contributing authors or concluding expository essay by Diamond herself.

This strikes me still as something missing, something that would have rounded off the discussions and have offered Diamond a platform from which to look back on what she thinks she has accomplished and who, if any, of her well-wishers have properly understood what she has been about.

After reading the papers, it was clear in any case that there was scant discussion devoted specifically to Diamond's work to which she could have responded. My personal sense of a missed opportunity to learn something more concrete about Diamond's thought aside, the innocent reader should be advised that the otherwise independently interesting essays in this volume will absolutely not satisfy their desire to be much enlightened about Diamond's philosophy.

For that, we shall have to read or re-read Diamond's books and essays, and undertake to formulate on our own what might have been provided here as a starting place toward working out a retrospective critical appraisal of Diamond's interpretation of Wittgenstein and philosophy of the moral life.

Right at the beginning of the series, a topic emerged in the course of our conversation with the guest that presented a number of provocative avenues we wanted to further explore with her. And doing so at the end of a period of particular religious or moral intensity seems especially fitting. Which is to say, we are never not moral agents. But is this not a recipe for exhaustion and, ultimately, despair? Fatigue is a fascinating moral phenomenon.

It can, of course, be a consequence of the practice of moral attentiveness, a willingness to face the realities of the world and of our complicity with injustice. So what are we to make of the experience of fatigue? What are its dangers? But, perhaps most importantly, how are we to respond to it when it overtakes us? Audio Player failed to load. Play Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.

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Skip to content Main Navigation. Looking for something? Generic selectors. Exact matches only. Search in title. Search in content. Search in excerpt. Search in posts. Experience tells me, for example, that what people mean and understand by pet varies considerably from household to household as does their treatment of them. Or is this only morally irrelevant when considering whether the roadkill is acceptable for dinner? While generally agreeing with Diamond, Justin E. Smith does find problems with her approach.

For those interested, you can find his discussion of the topic here:. Daniel, I think I addressed the argument, but let me expand on it and lets see if it is satisfactory.

One issue that comes up especially after your reply is the existence of multiple causes for some effect and the sufficiency of any one of them for the effect. So, my point was that yes, Diamond can be right that reducing how we behave with respect to other humans, to pleasure and pain, leaves out other things, and those other things can also be a sufficient cause for the effect here not eating humans.

When there are multiple sufficient causes, switching one off while leaving the other still means that the effect takes place. People who have pets care about suffering of pets all the time for instance by taking them to vets. Diamond might have more force when arguing against some tech sector reductionisms, where the style of argument is all relevant human factors can be reduced to A and since we have simulated A we have recreated the human experience.

More directly, even without Singer and so on, we directly see that this moral relevance transfers when we notice people stopping someone from throwing stones at a stray dog. Just by seeing the dogs reactions barking in fear, running away , without even getting into the studies of biologists on the shared features of the nervous systems.

In fact, we can plausibly say that factory farming managers avoid videos because of this reason because they know that the relevant factors like concern for pain transfer to animals. Would Wittgenstein have been one? Would the concept have made him laugh? Did Wittgenstein ever laugh? Anyway, a very intriguing piece. For philosophers to declare that the reason people do X refrain from cannibalism is Y seems pretty odd to me; only slightly less odd to declare that the reason people should do X not eat animals, or employ them without recompense is Y.

This suggests some unexpected to me congruence between Wittgenstein and Clifford Geertz, as well as many contemporary possibly Geertz-inspired historians. In any case, I think it makes an interesting start appetizer? And her argument fits nicely with my own view. Indeed, humans rarely have interest in consuming shit, but that is not because it is in some moral category related to fellow creature, and an unease in eating it might stand even if properly processed to remove any chance of physical illness from its eating.

Some animals are not allowed to be eaten because they are more pure than us, while others incapable of being eaten until certain procedures unrelated to bodily health are performed, and some incapable of being eaten under any circumstance.

And of course she does not treat the fact that some humans do eat humans, taking a very modern western viewpoint. When things appear to suffer in ways that we can identify with, there is usually a resulting desire to stop that suffering. Ironically humans can empathize with the suffering of inanimate objects a forgotten or abused toy, fictional characters in a book or movie , or not empathize with clearly suffering creatures certain animals in zoos, bullfights.

The treatment of animals as livestock to some degree demands a practiced lack of empathy. This is not say that is wrong, but it is clear an abundance of empathy is not going to result in functional meat production.

It seems a plausible method to elicit empathic feelings in order to generate interest in protecting animals from being eaten or otherwise killed. She provided the necessary evidence to challenge Singer-like positions which take a legalistic approach, identifying criteria commonly used to create legal categories, to argue for the moral rights of animals. Moral reasoning and categorization is different than legal reasoning and categorization. Of course, vegetarianism is largely for us as omnivores a freedom we only get to exercise under specific conditions.

Given enough hunger modulating categories like pet or even fellow human can lose their power. Singerites to my mind have lost this perspective, assuming some idealized condition most people are not living in, much less capable of living in, and ignoring that there are morally salient feelings beyond empathy, justice, and non-cruelty.

As a Wittgensteinian she is not going to make universalist claims. She is talking about arguments for ethical veganism in modern, Western countries. This is not what her article is about.

It is about a very specific thing: common arguments for ethical veganism. It is not about suffering in general. It is not about ethical virtue. I agree with you re: Singer but would go even further. All I can say is this. Every Michelin award winning chef an arch-criminal. Not only is none of this true, but it is patently absurd.

Not only are the great chefs, restaurants, charcuteries, etc. So I see nothing wrong with great restaurants or individual families serving meat recipes, as long as the animals are raised humanely. Obviously, humane treatment of animals would raise the price of meat, so it would become a special dish.

Besides the suffering of animals in factory farming, there are good environmental reasoning for learning to live with vegetable protein sources as our main everyday protein sources. Again, Diamond — and I — are responding to the sorts of arguments made by people like Singer, which have precisely the extreme implications I have described. We are not responding to moderate, measured, reasonable individual positions like yours. It would be more correct to say that pets, friends, fellow citizens of a thriving republic in peacetime, socially parasitic animals such as rats, sacred animals, zoo animals in times other than famines, are not to be eaten or killed, whereas large wild game, rats when one is desperate, industrially slaughtered cattle, and, yes, human enemies in wartime, may be both killed and eaten.

There may be morally relevant distinctions between humans and animals, but we are not going to discover them by looking at the actual range of what people conceptualize, under various circumstances, as edible or inedible. Although this journey to the far East, I suppose, might support some notion of conceptualized dispensation by consulting a GPS device of your choice. Excellent discussion Daniel — I do agree entirely. This is indeed where my own theory lies, and yes, my ideas can be quite immoral.

No, not objectively so. Perhaps this can provide a type of meat which happens to be far more tasty than any other variety. I want to thank you for posting on this topic and for being willing to debate it with a layperson like myself. Not all professional philosophers, even those with blogs, are open to debating topics with non-philosophers: they often pull rank or cite articles or books which are not accessible to the general public.

Korea is not a modern, Westernized country? Are you suggesting that the problem some may have with Diamond is that her view is not normative enough? That is, it describes rather than prescribes? I only just finished reading the paper.

Nothing I can disagree with there,if I have understood it. Presenter Chair: Scott Stephens. Producer Sinead Lee. Has the pandemic shown the unassailability of utilitarianism — or its inherent limitations? Thu 7 Oct Has democratic politics become too contemptuous of everyday life? Thu 30 Sep Should we avoid humiliating the unvaccinated? Thu 23 Sep Fri 17 Sep

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Cora Diamond Danke an Designs. cora_diamond, profile picture hostleague.ru [email protected] Cora Diamond. @cora_diamond. Last seen 15 hours ago. ⚜Tattoomodel & Webcamgirl ⚜ Do what you love! I am the new one here. Cora Diamond (University of Virginia): 4/10/ “Murdoch Off the Map, or Taking Empiricism Back from the Empiricists”. Part of the Is Philosophy Nonsense? .